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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS USED 
The following abbreviations and acronyms occur in this document. Explanations 
are supplied in the text where it is doubtful whether a term is in everyday use. 
ADSL Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line 
AES Advanced Encryption Standard 
Affine Transformation A transformation consisting of 
multiplication by a matrix followed by 
the addition of a vector. 
AH Authenticating Header (an IPSec 
protocol) 
ANSI American National Standards Institute 
Array An enumerated collection of identical 
entities (e.g., an array of bytes). 
ASIC Application Specific Integrated Circuit 
ATM Asynchronous Transfer Mode; high-
bandwidth packet- switching 
technology. 
ATM Asynchronous Transfer Mode, a 53-
byte fixed-length cell relay 
B2B Business-to-Business E-Commerce 
B2C Business-to-Consumer E-Commerce 
CA Certification Authority (for digital 
certificates) 
CGI Common Gateway Interface 
CHAP Challenge Handshake Authentication 
protocol (also in Microsoft-specific 
version, MS-CHAP), found in PPTP 
cs cw Computer-based Systems for 
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Cooperative Work 
CTCPEC Canadian Trusted Computer Product 
Evaluation Criteria 
CUG Closed User Group 
DEA Data Encryption Algorithm (ANSI 
Standard) 
DEA-I Data Encryption Algorithm (ISO 
Standard) 
DES Data Encryption Standard 
DES-CBC DES - Cipher Block Chaining mode 
DHTML Dynamic Hypertext Markup Language 
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm 
DSL Digital Subscriber Line 
DSP Digital signal processor 
DSS Digital Signature Standard (from NIST) 
ebXML Electronic Business XML 
EDI Electronic Data Interchange 
EFF Electronic Frontier Foundation 
E-RD Entity-Relationship Diagram 
ESP Encapsulating Security Payload (an 
IPSEC protocol) 
FIPS Federal Information Processing 
Standard 
FPGA Field Programmable Gate Array 
FTP File Transfer Protocol 
GDSS Group Decision Support Systems 
GRE Generic Routing Encapsulation 
GSS Group Support Systems 
HDM Hypermedia Data Model 
HMAC Hashed Message Authentication Code 
HTML Hypertext Markup Language 
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HTML Hypertext Mark-up Language 
HTTP Hypertext Transport Protocol 
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force 
IKE Internet Key Exchange, a combination 
of ISAKMP and OAKLEY; also known 
asIKMP 
IKMP Internet Key Management Protocol 
IOIS Inter-organizational Information 
System 
IOS Inter-organizational System 
IP Internet Protocol, a connectionless 
network layer protocol. 
IP Sec Secure Internet Protocol 
ISAKMP Internet Security Association and Key 
Management Protocol (RFC 2408) 
ISDN Integrated Services Digital Network, 
digital circuit-switched technology 
ISO International Standards Organisation 
ISP Internet Service Provider 
ITS EC European Information Technology 
Security Evaluation Criteria 
JAD Joint Application Design 
JDK Java Development Kit 
JIT Just-In-Time (compilation) 
KDC Kerberos Distribution Centre 
L2F Layer 2 Forwarding Protocol, a Cisco 
VPN encapsulating protocol 
L2TP Layer 2 Tunnelling Protocol, a Cisco-
developed VPN protocol 
MD5 Message Digest 5, a hashing algorithm 
from RSA 
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MIME Multi-purpose Internet mail extension 
MMX Matrix Math extension 
MPLS Multi-protocol Label Switching 
NAT Network Address Translation 
NBS National Bureau of Standards 
NIST National Institute of Standards and 
Technology(formerly NBS, National 
Bureau of Standards) 
NTD Network Terminating Device 
OAKLEY Key Establishment protocol (RFC 
2412) 
ODBC Open Data Base Connectivity 
OS Operating System 
PDU Protocol Data Unit (in OSI Reference 
Model) 
PGP Pretty Good Privacy, an e-mail privacy 
utility that uses public key encryption 
PKCS Public Key Cryptography Standard 
from RSA Security Laboratories 
PKI Public Key Infrastructure (for digital 
certificates) 
PKIX Public Key Infrastructure X.509 (IETF) 
PPP Point-to-point protocol, a layer 2 WAN 
protocol 
PPTP Point-to-point Tunnelling Protocol, a 
Microsoft VPN encapsulating Layer 3 
PSTN Public Service Telecommunication 
Network 
RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial In User 
Service 
RAM Random Access Memory 
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RAS Remote Access Service (a Microsoft 
Server service) 
RC2,RC4 Rivest Cryptosystem 2, 4 (symmetric 
encryption algorithms designed by 
Ronald Rivest) 
ROM Read-only memory 
RMON Remote network monitoring 
RSA Key agreement protocol developed by 
Rivest, Shamir and Adelman 
SA Security Association (an IP Sec 
protocol) 
S/MIME Secure Multipurpose Internet Mail 
Extensions, a protocol for securing e-
mail attachments 
SET Secure Electronic Transaction, an e-
commerce protocol 
SHA-1 Secure Hash Algorithm - 1 
SOCKS A session layer proxy security protocol. 
SSL Secure Sockets Layer, a protocol for 
incorporating encryption into e-
commerce transactions, developed by 
Netscape 
TACACS Terminal Access Controller Access 
TCP Transmission Control Protocol 
TCP/IP Transmission Control Protocol/ Internet 
Protocol 
TCSEC Trusted Computer System Evaluation 
Criteria 
TLS The IETF' s Transport Layer Protocol 
(also called SSL 3.1). 
UDP User Datagram Protocol 
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URL Uniform Resource Locator 
VHDL VHSIC Hardware Description 
Language. 
VHS IC Very High Speed Integrated Circuits. 
VLAN Virtual Local Area Network 
VPN Virtual Private Network 
WAN Wide Area Network 
XML Extensible Mark-up Language 
XOR Exclusive-OR operation. 
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Chapter 1 
THE PROBLEM AND ITS CONTEXT 
1.1. Introduction 
In recent years, competitive pressures have spawned numerous alliances and 
partnerships among various organizations. One trading partner (wholesaler, 
retailer or manufacturer) generally requires certain items and/or services from 
another trading partner. Interactions between such trading partners include 
obtaining updated prices, querying availability of required items, placing of 
orders, making payments, returning faulty/damaged goods (exchange of debit 
notes and credit notes), lodging complaints, and advertising of goods on offer or 
of "special offers". Common tools of interaction include telephones, facsimile 
machines, E-mail, postal/courier services, dedicated inter-organizational 
networks, electronic data interchange (EDI), and, more recently, the Internet. 
Internet technology has limitless potential for improving the quality of this 
interaction. However, in the context of trading partners, new concerns are also 
introduced. These include network management issues, such as bandwidth 
availability and security issues. 
Making security implementations compatible and interoperable across the 
unsecured Internet poses a serious problem for designers of such inter-
organizational systems. If two organizations wish to form an alliance, extending 
connectivity between them in a private network environment would generally 
require dedicated connections, compatible equipment, separate dial domains (if 
dial access is used), and network architecture and management policies that must 
be negotiated and maintained. Fortunately, Internet technology has given rise to 
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Extranet Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) (explained in Definition of Key Terms 
below), which obviates these problems to a large extent. For this reason, VPNs 
have become very popular in inter-organizational systems. A Gartner Group 
survey estimates that by 2003 nearly 100% of enterprises will supplement their 
wide area network (WAN) infrastructures with VPNs. (Cisco1, 1999). 
The primary challenge in a VPN Extranet set-up revolves around matching 
security architectures and management. Variations and nuances in security 
implementations exacerbate the interoperability problem. Each partner may, for 
example, employ a different combination of possible security protocols: 
S/MIME, PGP, SSL, SET, IPSec, L2TP, L2F, PPTP, etc. (See Abbreviations and 
Acronyms Used). Further, differences may occur in encryption algorithms, 
encryption keys, certification authorities, firewall policies, and whether the 
public Internet or a Frame Relay or ATM backbone is used. (These concepts will 
also be elaborated later). Variations may be even more granular, e.g. in respect of 
specific protocol configurations used by each trading partner. (Cisco1, 1999; 
Cisco2, 2000). How does one reconcile these differences across the Internet 
chasm? 
Once trading partners have been discovered and collaboration agreements have 
been reached, security mechanisms must be integrated to ensure uniform 
implementation of standard security services such as authentication, privacy, 
integrity, authorization and non-repudiation. In the context of global VPNs, the 
diversity of implementation possibilities, and the expected growth rate in VPN 
connections, a means for ensuring such interoperability is required. This 
research, therefore, endeavours to address this need. 
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1.2. Essential Terminology 
1.2. 1. Definitions and Meanings of Key Terms 
1.2. 1. 1. Electronic Commerce Terms 
The key terms are explained below: 
• B2B (E-Commerce): A specific electronic commerce scenario comprising 
two trading partners. Lawrence et al. (2000, p3) summarize the essential 
perspectives of e-commerce as: (Using Internet technology for) 
o Communications - to deliver information, products/services and 
payments; 
o Business - to perform transactions and work flows; 
o Service - customer relationship and product delivery logistics 
management; and 
o Online transactions - the electronic data network aspect (the Internet). 
• Extranet: An inter-organizational network based on Internet protocols and 
infrastructure. An Intranet is a corporate network utilizing Internet 
technology. An extranet is an extended intranet, which links remote intranets 
or individuals over Virtual Private Networks built on the Internet. (Chung et 
al, 2000, p.241). 
• Hypermedia: Elements and processes in an application which include 
navigation features such as browsing, backtracking, content-based query, and 
queries based on the hypermedia link structure. A key component of 
hypermedia is the set of hypertext elements. Other components include sound 
and graphics files. (Bieber and lsakowitz, 1996). 
• Inter-Organizational Information System (IOIS): This refers to automated 
information systems shared by two or more organizations (Choudury, 1997). 
• Trading Partner: One member of at least two collaborating organizations. 
The collaboration is defined by a variable set of organized activities, which 
includes designing, producing, promoting, marketing, selling, delivering, and 
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supporting the products or services, undertaken between them. (Sachs et al, 
2000). 
• Virtual Private Network (VPN): A VPN is an enterprise network deployed 
on a shared infrastructure employing the same security, management, and 
throughput policies applied in a private network. A VPN may utilize the 
public Internet or service provider backbones (generally IP, Frame Relay or 
ATM networks). They are characterized by an encrypted tunnel between 
clients and servers. (Ciscol, 1999) 
1.2. 1.2. Common Information Security Terms 
In this section, general security concepts will be briefly explained. 
Gollmann (1999:5) states that there is often disagreement about precise 
definitions of security aspects and that most definitions are based on major 
sources such as the US Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC; 
the "Orange Book"), the European Information Technology Security Evaluation 
Criteria (ITSEC), the Canadian Trusted Computer Product Evaluation Criteria 
(CTCPEC) and the International Standards Organization's ISO 7498-2. 
The following definitions are primarily intended to eliminate any equivocal 
meanings of security-related terminology used in this dissertation. They are 
based on the academic textbook by Pfleeger (1997:3-65), except where otherwise 
indicated. For this reason, references to material from Pfleeger will generally be 
omitted. 
The following are some common terms used in discussing security: 
• Exposure: a form of possible loss or harm. 
• Vulnerability: a weakness in the system that might be exploited for loss 
or harm. 
• Attack: the exploitation of one or more vulnerabilities. 
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• Threats: circumstances that have the potential to cause loss or harm. 
• Control: protective measure - action, device, technique or procedure -
that reduces vulnerability. 
• Risk Analysis: the evaluation of the seriousness of a threat, the 
likelihood of it occurring and the cost of implementing a suitable 
countermeasure (control) (Hassler, 2001:4). 
• Principals: human users, computers or computer processed (Hassler, 
2001:3). 
• The Goals of Security are considered to be: 
o Confidentiality (secrecy and privacy): This ensures that assets are 
accessible to only authorised parties. 
o Integrity: This ensures that assets can only be modified by authorised 
parties and in authorised ways. 
o Availability: This ensures that assets are accessible to authorised 
parties; it includes, inter alia, deadlock management. The term "denial 
of service" is often used to depict the effect of an attack on 
availability. 
Gollmann (1999:8) adds the following two to the list: 
o Accountability: This ensures that actions affecting security may be 
traced to specific individuals; audit information is required. 
o Reliability and Safety (Dependability): This ensures that reliance 
can justifiably be placed on the service a computer system is intended 
to deliver. 
• The major assets to protect in a computing system are: 
o hardware, 
o software and 
o data. 
These can be extended to include: 
o Storage media; 
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o Networks; 
o Access to computing equipment, e.g. the theft of computer time; and 
o Key people. 
• Threats, Security Services and Attacks 
There are essentially four kinds of threat to the security of a computer system: 
interruption, interception, modification and fabrication. These may be 
defined as follows: 
o Interception refers to the capture of data in transit. If this data is 
meant to be secret, and is viewed by the interceptor, then 
confidentiality/privacy has been breached. If the data is altered, then 
integrity has been compromised. If the data is prevented from being 
transmitted, then availability is being compromised. The first instance 
is considered eavesdropping while the latter two would constitute 
message-tampering (Hassler 2001:3-4). 
o Interruption implies an incidental break in a process/service. If the 
interruption is a deliberate break, then availability of the 
process/service has been compromised. 
o Modification is the altering of assets to cause mischief/harm. If the 
data is deliberately modified to mislead, then integrity has been 
compromised. Software modification includes using Trojan horses, 
viruses, trapdoors (programs with secret entry points), and 
information leaks (deliberately or inadvertently, in a program, to 
make information accessible to unintended people or programs). This 
is also referred to as infiltration (Hassler, 2001:4). 
o Fabrication implies falsification. False data is "planted" to pose as 
the correct form of data. This is an attack on the integrity of the data 
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set. Hassler (2001:3-4) also lists masquerading (using another 
principle's identity) and replaying (using a previously sent message 
to gain another principal's use-privileges) as similar attacks. 
Masquerading is also known as spoofing (e.g. Pabrai and Gurbani, 
1996:3). 
o Traffic Analysis allows an interceptor to obtain information about 
relationships, types of data, etc, exchanged between parties. Traffic 
padding is the mechanism used to prevent this form of attack. (Pabrai 
and Gurbani, 1996:6). 
The words in italics in the list above are termed security services. On the basis 
of risk analysis, one can define a security policy that clearly specifies what must 
be secured. The functions that enforce a security policy are what are referred to 
as security services. (Hassler, 2001:5). The International Standards Organization 
(ISO) (cited in Hassler, 2001:5-6) identifies the following additional basic 
security services: 
o Authentication: This ensures the authenticity of the origin of data or 
of a principle's identity. 
o Access control: This ensures controlled differential access to 
protected resources. 
o Data confidentiality: Also called privacy, this ensures that only 
authorized principals can understand the protected data. 
o Data integrity: This ensures that data is not modified by 
unauthorized principals. 
o Non-repudiation: This ensures that either the receiver cannot deny 
having received data or the sender cannot deny having sent the data, 
or both. 
Actual attacks (exploiting vulnerabilities) include: viruses, worms, Trojan 
horses, trap doors, logic bombs, port scanning, IP address spoofing, sequence 
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number spoofing, session hijacking, DNS spoofing, man-in-the-middle attacks, 
DNS poisoning, redirects, replay attacks, password cracking, social engineering, 
sniffing, web site defacement, war dialling, ping of death, SYN flooding, 
spamming, and smurf attacks (Canavan, 2001: 25-43). 
Security controls need to be put in place to prevent such attacks. Some of these 
are outlined in the next sub-section. 
• Security Controls 
Security services are implemented by means of security controls/mechanisms, 
which may be broadly categorized as: 
o Implemented policies (e.g., frequency of change of passwords), 
o Physical controls (locked doors, labelled data, etc), 
o Encryption, 
o Software controls (e.g., database access controls), and 
o Hardware controls (smart card controls, locks, etc). 
Hassler (2001:6-47) prefers to discuss controls in terms of security services, as 
follows: 
o Encryption mechanisms: generally, protect confidentiality. 
o Digital signature mechanisms: provide source authentication and 
integrity services. 
o Access control mechanisms: closely connected to authentication. 
o Data integrity mechanisms: protect data from unauthorised 
alteration. 
o Authentication exchange mechanisms: authenticate the sender on 
both sides. 
o Traffic padding mechanisms: offer protection against traffic 
analysis. 
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o Routing control mechanisms: allow a specific path to be chosen for 
sending data through a network, as well as the acceptance or rejection 
of incoming traffic; provide authentication and access control. 
o Notarisation mechanisms: are third parties that ensure integrity, 
origin, time or destination of data; provide authentication and non-
repudiation services. 
Greenstein and Feinman (2000: 228) provide the following table (modified) 
of more specific security controls and their corresponding security services: 
SECURITY SERVICE SECURITY CONTROL 
Confidentiality Encryption 
Integrity Hashing (Digest) 
Authentication Digital Signatures 
Challenge-response 
Passwords 
Biometric devices 
Access Control Firewalls 
Passwords 
Biometric devices 
Non-repudiation Bi-directional hashing 
Digital signatures 
Transaction certificates 
Time stamps 
Confirmation services 
• Basic Encryption Terms: 
Unless otherwise specified, the main source of information in this regard is 
Pfleeger (1997:21-65). 
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o Encryption may be defined as the process of encoding a message so that 
its meaning is not obvious. It may be represented as follows (Kaufman et 
al, 1995:39): 
Plaintext-7encryption-7ciphertext-7 decryption-7 original plain text 
Other useful definitions include: 
o Enciphering is the translation of letters or symbols individually, 
while encoding involves entire words or phrases. 
o Cryptography implies hidden writing or using encryption to conceal 
text. 
o Cryptanalysis is the study of encryption and encrypted messages 
with the goal of finding hidden meanings of messages. 
o Cryptology is the study of encryption (includes cryptography and 
cryptanalysis). 
o Cipher refers to a set of encryption operations. 
1.2.2. The 828 10/S Context 
An Extranet implies an inter-organizational wide area network (WAN) based on 
Internet protocols and infrastructure, comprised of a selected group of participant 
private networks. The nature of the collaboration need not necessarily include 
formal business transactions. Barna (1996), e.g., describes an academic 
"colaboratory", which is an Extranet comprised of different academic 
institutions. An Extranet comprises, by definition, at least one VPN (e.g., Turban 
et al, 2000: 243). It is also an Inter-Organizational System (IOS) and, generally, 
an Inter-Organizational Information System (IOIS) (defined in section 1.2.1.1. ). 
B2B refers to a specific e-commerce scenario: the conducting of electronic 
business between two organizations (trading partners), based on Internet 
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protocols and infrastructure. As such, it is a business-oriented Extranet. B2B and 
Extranets are therefore subsumed under IOS and IOIS. 
Thus, 
• "Extranet" implies the Internet and VPN, but not necessarily business; 
• "VPN" implies neither the Internet nor business, while 
• "B2B" implies business and Extranet, and, therefore, VPN. 
In identifying a term with the implicit connotations of: Extranet, E-Commerce 
(Internet and business), trading partners, VPN, and the various IOIS types 
(Chapter 2) - in order to describe the context of this investigation, "B2B IOIS" 
seems the most appropriate. In "B2B IOIS", "Extranet" and "VPN" are implied 
and are therefore superfluous. "IOIS", although redundant in "B2B IOIS", is 
retained to denote the various manifestations of IOIS (as described by 
Choudury's typology in Chapter 2). 
In the remainder of this document, "B2B IOIS" will have the connotations as 
described above. 
1 .3. The Research Problem 
Each trading partner in a B2B IOIS may implement various permutations of 
security controls. This is a major impediment to ensuring the required level of 
interoperability between trading partners. Hence, the following question is 
investigated: Can a framework be formulated to facilitate sufficient congruence 
between collaborating systems to overcome this problem? 
1 .4. The Sub-problems 
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a. What are the risks and corresponding controls currently documented for 
B2B IOISs? 
b. Can a framework be proposed to ensure the interoperability of electronic 
business security implementations between trading partners in a B2B 
IOIS context? 
c. Can the proposed framework (sub-problem b. above) satisfy existing 
evaluation criteria in terms of optimal interoperability of security 
implementations between trading partners, in the B2B IOIS context? 
1 .5. The Delimitations and Scope of this Research 
The proposed solution will focus on integrating security structures from a 
functional services perspective. The following are considered integral factors in 
the solution, but in-depth treatment of each is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation: 
• Describing business processes outside of the security context, i.e. the 
business operational view; 
• Broader electronic business issues (such as the contractual qualities of 
digital signatures); and 
• Broader network management and security management issues. 
1.6. The Organization of Chapters 
The chapters have been organized as follows: 
• Chapter 1 is a brief introduction. 
• Chapter 2 discusses Inter-organizational Information Systems (IOISs) in 
terms of benefits, classification and management (e.g., Massetti and 
Zmud, 1996; Kumar and Dissel, 1996; Choudury, 1997). This is of 
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fundamental importance, since the sharing or exchange of information 
between trading partners presupposes some form of IOIS. 
• Chapter 3 examines existing security models in a business-to-business 
(B2B) electronic commerce context, specifically, the UNIFACT/OASIS 
electronic business XML (ebXML) standard (UN/CEFACT and OASIS 1, 
2000; UN/CEFACT and OASIS2-8, 2001). 
• Chapter 4 focuses on exactly what is required in possible security 
implementations in B2B IOISs for optimal interoperability, and where the 
strengths and deficits in this regard lay in existing models, standards and 
implementations. It covers, inter alia, current Virtual Private Network 
technologies (e.g. King et al 2001: 177-215; Cisco1, 1999; Cisco3, 1999 
Cisco4, 2000). 
• Chapter 5 attempts a synthesis of ideas extracted from information in the 
previous chapters. A possible framework for optimum interoperability 
between trading partners in B2B IOISs is derived. 
• Chapter 6 supplies arguments and relevant criteria for evaluating the 
contentions raised in Chapter 5. 
• Chapter 7 reports the outcome of the evaluation in chapter 6. Chapter 7 
also concludes with statements regarding the significance and validity of 
the research and relevant thoughts for the future. 
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Chapter 2 
INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter reviews the related literature on Inter-Organizational Information 
Systems (IOISs) specifically in relation to trading partners, but not necessarily in 
relation to the Internet. IOISs constitute the background within which this 
research finds its point-of-departure. The intention behind this chapter is to 
provide some insight into the context of B2B IOISs, which will be explored in 
more detail in later chapters. Chapters 3 and 4 are intended to elaborate on the 
security aspects of B2B IOISs. 
The literature survey for this chapter was directed by the following questions, 
considered pertinent in this regard: 
• Why do organizations become involved in Inter-Organizational Systems 
(IOSs)? What is the motivation for relatively persistent trading partners? 
• What are the benefits provided by the Internet technology (in B2B) over 
previous private Inter-Organizational Systems (IOSs) network links? 
What is the nature of Internet-based (B2B) IOISs? 
• What are the implementation options available in choosing Inter-
Organizational Information Systems (IOISs) as a business strategy? 
In subsequent sections the following will be discussed. 
• The reasons for the electronic integration - to varying degrees - of 
trading partner information systems (Section 2.2.). 
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• The impact on this phenomenon (IOISs) made by the advent of 
Internet technology (B2B IOISs) (Section 2.3.). 
• A taxonomical view of IOISs; the nuances of implementation options 
which make a singular security solution difficult (Section 2.4.). 
2.2. Drivers for IOISs 
The following general reasons for cooperation between participants in Inter-
Organizational Systems have been identified (Kumar and Dissel, 1996): 
• Globalization: the trend to trade world-wide; 
• Environmental turbulence: business process re-engineering driven by dynamic 
technological factors; 
• Resource pooling: sharing resources with business partners to lower costs; 
• Risk-sharing: sharing business processes and resources to reduce risk; 
• Reducing supply-chain uncertainty: ensuring availability and fulfilment from 
suppliers, and to customers; and 
• Increasing resource utilization: ensuring more efficient use of machinery and 
skills, e.g. through readily available real-time transaction capability. 
Additional factors include (Massetti and Zmud, 1996): 
• The improved speed and quality of computations; 
• Increased availability of data/information; and 
• The reduction in required manpower and operations. 
The IOIS drivers outlined above serve to illustrate why B2B electronic 
commerce is rapidly building on the infrastructural capability provided by the 
Internet and IOIS technologies such as Electronic Digital/Data Interchange. 
Factors such as globalization, reducing supply-chain uncertainty and real-time 
transaction-processing have been greatly enhanced by the ubiquitous use of the 
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Internet. The next section discusses how the Internet extends the benefits of 
IOISs by virtue of its added hypermedia benefits. 
2.3. The implications of hypermedia-based IOISs 
2.3. 1. Benefits of hypermedia in 10/Ss 
Older Group Decision Support Systems (GDSS) and Computer-Based Systems 
for Cooperative Work (CSCW) or "groupware" lacked emphasis on media 
richness, communication bandwidth, geographic scope and real-time 
communication capability. Internet technology, in the form of B2B E-
Commerce, provides these features through a single, open user interface: the 
Web Browser (Barna et al, 1995). Current systems allow for technologies such as 
Dynamic HTML and streaming multimedia to provide dynamic, animated audio-
visual presentations. Broader-bandwidth technologies (such as: optic fibre, DSL, 
ISDN, Frame Relay and ATM) have done much to change the quality of 
groupware. 
The more-obvious motivational factors for implementing a B2B E-commerce 
IOS include: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Providing a presence on the Internet has corporate-image ramifications; 
including allowing smaller organizations to compete with larger ones; 
It allows for targeting a broader market segment; 
Brick-and-mortar shop fronts and concomitant staff requirements are 
obviated; 
Business processes become more streamlined, thereby reducing (essentially, 
human) errors, and increasing productivity; 
Both hardware and software requirements for client computers are greatly 
reduced. The only client software required, aside from the operating system, 
is a browser; 
It involves EDI-like exchange of business documents (orders, invoices, etc); 
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• 
• 
The communication infrastructure is cheaper; instead of costly dedicated 
lines, either dialup (PSTN or ISDN) lines could be leased from 
telecommunication organizations. Various newer cost-effective options (such 
as DSL) are now available. All telecommunications utilize the Internet; thus 
all calls are charged at local-call rates; and 
Processing of transactions and accessing trading partner data (such as prices, 
availability, etc) can be done in real-time. 
2.3. 1. Problems introduced by hypermedia in 10/Ss 
Internet technology, unfortunately, also seems to bring with it a few significant 
disadvantages, including: 
• 
• 
Higher bandwidth and quality-of-service requirements due to hypermedia 
components. This implies more expensive hardware. As operating systems 
and supporting applications improve to accommodate hypermedia 
capabilities, so the platform requirements spiral progressively outwards. 
The public nature of the Internet and the increasing power of desktop 
computers have additional ramifications for security. This will be elaborated 
in subsequent chapters. 
2.4. Options available in selecting an 1018 
2.4. 1. Types of 10/S 
Various classifications of IOIS exist. Most notable are those presented by 
Choudury (1997) and Kumar and Dissel (1996). Within the B2B IOIS context, 
the subtle differences in classifications are merely of historical significance. Brief 
descriptions of the classifications are provided to illustrate the overall IOIS 
context as the precursor for the B2B IOIS context. It will become clear in later 
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paragraphs that the IOIS type of major significance is the multilateral electronic 
market type, underpinned by the ebXML standard. 
An IOIS may involve two participants or more. The business strategy behind the 
IOIS maybe 
• Either competitive, e.g., a organization might collaborate with another 
organization which has already collaborated with a rival of the first 
organization; or 
• cooperative; in which case it may be 
o either a strategic alliance among a few selected organizations, 
o or a ''public good" and is open to all organizations. (Choudury, 
1997). 
Choudury (1997) proposes a typology comprising three different IOIS types: 
• Multilateral 10/Ss: A buyer/seller interacts with a large, potentially 
unlimited, number of trading partners over a single logical inter-
organizational link. Examples include (cooperative) electronic markets 
(citing Malone et al. 1987) and (competitive) electronic 
shopping/broadcast sales systems. Kumar and Dissel (1996) discuss 
"Pooled Information Resource" IOISs in much the same way: A pooled 
dependency, where participants share and use common resources e.g., a 
common data-processing centre used by a number of organizations, 
common databases, common communication networks, and common 
applications such as used in airline reservation systems. 
• Electronic Dyads: These are bilateral IOISs. Each buyer/seller 
establishes individual logical links with other selected sellers/buyers. 
Electronic Digital Interchange (EDI) links are a common example. 
Kumar and Dissel (1996) describe a similar "Networked Resource" IOIS. 
A reciprocal dependency exists e.g., teams from various organizations 
working towards designing, developing and delivering a common 
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product. They typically represent joint ventures, which may be long-term 
or short-term. Manifestations include e-mail, fax and voice 
communication and even the use of desktop/screen-sharing technologies, 
CAD/CASE data interchange and repositories, discussion databases, 
synchronous and asynchronous time/place computer-based systems for 
supporting collaborative work and video-conferencing. 
• Electronic Monopolies: These IOISs support a sole source relationship 
for a product (or set of products). They are a special case of electronic 
dyad - a bilateral IOIS, but only one link is established between a buyer 
and a seller. These IOISs are similarly depicted by Kumar and Dissel 
(1996) as "Value/Supply Chain" IOISs. They represent a sequential 
dependency, where the output of one organization becomes the input for 
another organization. They are strategic necessities rather than strategic 
advantages. The primary motives for the collaboration are the reduction 
of uncertainties in the supply chain, thereby gaining cost, cycle-time, and 
quality advantages, over competing supply chains in the industry. 
Kumar and Dissel ( 1996) suggest that there is a trend observed in the literature 
that organizations are moving (from competitive) towards more collaborative 
relationships. Choudury' s typology is illustrated on the following page (Figure 
1). 
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FIGURE 1: TYPES OF IOIS ACCORDING TO CHOUDURY (1997) 
31 
2.4.2. Management Aspects of 10/Ss 
An important aspect of IOISs is the management concept: sustainable 
collaboration (Kumar and Dissel, 1996). The typology used by these researchers, 
corresponds with Choudury's typology, so Choudury's nomenclature will be 
used instead (for the sake of continuity). 
Kumar and Dissel (1996) contend (in relation to sustainable collaboration) that: 
• Increased interdependence leads to increased potential for conflict, hence 
the need for coordination is increased. Choudury ( 1997) also refers to 
electronic integration, the degree with which any two organizations are 
linked electronically. Electronic integration is generally higher in an 
Electronic Dyad and is highest in an Electronic Monopoly. The potential 
for conflict thus increases from Multilateral IOISs through Electronic 
Dyads to Electronic Monopolies. 
• The level of structure and coordination in the relationship is of the utmost 
importance. Lack of structure leads to equivocality, which contributes to 
the risk of conflict. "Structure" is defined as "the level of specification of 
roles, obligations, rights, procedures, information flows, data, and 
analysis and computational methods used in the inter-organizational 
relationship." 
• The greater the level of pre-specification of these coordination aspects, 
the greater the initial structure in the relationship. Pre-specifications are 
recommended as follows: 
o Muliteral IOIS - Standards and rules 
o Electronic Dyad - Standards, rules, schedules and plans 
o Electronic Monopoly - Standards, rules, schedules, plans and 
mutual adjustment. 
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2.5. Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to introduce the context of the research problem. 
Fundamental to the research problem is the concept of an Inter-Organizational 
Systems (IOS), which is defined in terms of electronic integration between two 
or more organizations. When data is exchanged or shared in such a relationship, 
the IOS qualifies as an Inter-Organizational Information System (IOIS) 
(Choudury, 1997). 
Three fundamental IOIS types were identified: 
• Multilateral/Pooled Information Resource, 
• Electronic Dyad/Networked Resource and 
• Electronic MonopolyNalue Chain. (Choudury, 1997; Kumar and Dissel, 
1996). 
Reasons for engaging in IOIS relationships, as well as the typical features of 
each, and factors influencing sustainable collaboration, were discussed. 
Electronic MonopolyN alue Chain IOISs have the highest potential for conflict 
and require the highest degree of management pre-specification (structure). 
Multilateral IOISs are at the opposite end of the scale. 
An Extranet represents a hypermedia-based IOIS, which utilizes the public 
Internet and is therefore a function of the Internet's associated infrastructure, 
standards and protocols. Business-to-business (B2B) E-Commerce Extranets are 
aimed at performing electronic business within one of the various IOIS contexts 
described earlier. An Extranet comprises Virtual Private Network (VPN) 
architecture, a specialized WAN (security) strategy superimposed onto any IOIS 
type. The B2B E-Commerce Extranet, which is the focus of this investigation, 
will simply be referred to as "B2B IOIS" in the rest of this document. 
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The following explanation is intended to illustrate the underlying security 
interoperability problem within the B2B IOIS context. The concepts used will be 
elaborated in subsequent chapters. Suppose that trading partner A (TP A) uses a 
Virtual Private Network to communicate with trading partner B (TPB). TP A may 
configure his web server to use PPTP, while TPB may use IPSec. Thus, client 
computers attempting to connect to respective web servers will be unable to do 
so. Even if this problem is resolved, and both trading partners start using IPSec, 
each might configure IPSec differently. The problem is exacerbated when 
additional trading partners join the extranet. In a multilateral IOIS/ electronic 
market, numerous trading partners may collaborate with each other. The 
interoperability challenge exists for each two trading partners. 
Chapter 3 attempts to examine current B2B IOIS models in order to refine the 
ultimate discussion on the interoperability problem. 
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Chapter 3 
Current Models for 828 1018 
3.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter described the context in which a solution to the problem of 
security interoperability is to be sought. This chapter examines the status quo in 
terms of available models to achieve this end. 
The focus of this chapter will be on ebXML (explained in detail below) as a 
reference model upon which to build B2B IOIS solutions. EDI will be described 
only very briefly as it is envisaged that ebXML will supplant EDI in the near 
future (see below). The framework architecture proposed in Chapter 5 attempts 
to incorporate ebXML. However, ebXML forms only part of the proposed 
framework and is not essential for ensuring interoperability. As a standard for 
B2B interaction, it provides an open platform, rather than a prescription for how 
to ensure interoperability. Indeed, it is this need for more comprehensive 
guidelines that have made this research necessary. 
3.2. Electronic Digital Interchange (EDI) 
EDI refers to the exchange of electronic business documents, e.g. invoices, debit 
notes, etc, between trading partner applications. No paper - and minimal human 
intervention - is involved. The documents are formatted according to published 
standards. (Greenstein and Feinman 2000: 101 ). 
EDI standards from the Accredited Standards Committee X 12 (ASC Xl2) in the 
USA and the United Nations' EDI for Administration, Commerce and Transport 
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(UN/EDIFACT) have in the past provided specifications (transaction sets) for 
electronic business exchanges between trading partners. A concerted effort is 
being made towards unifying these standards. 
(Schneider and Perry, 2001:331-345, Greenstein and Feinman 2000:109). 
EDI typically involves third party network services, called value-added-networks 
(V ANs). These services include EDI translation software, security assurances of 
data, reliability of service due to multiple alternative telecommunication links, 
EDI systems development assistance, and employee training sessions. The VAN 
executes only valid (authorized) transactions between valid trading partners, as 
prescribed by a signed contract. V ANs may be partially or fully integrated. 
(Greenstein and Feinman 2000: 104-107). 
However, some of the shortcomings of the EDI model include the following: 
• Only large companies have been able to afford to implement EDI and 
EDI implementations generally involve a dominant partner imposing a 
specific approach on its other partner(s). 
• It also requires specialized technical knowledge, is tightly-coupled, 
requires expensive dedicated networks and comprises an inflexible 
architecture. 
(UN/CEFACT and OASIS2, 2001, Greenstein and Feinman, 2000:101-102). 
• Extrapolating Choudury's classification (previous chapter), EDI seems to 
typify the electronic monopoly IOIS, which is predicated by higher 
electronic integration and increasing conflict. A greater degree of pre-
specification would therefore be required for sustainable collaboration (as 
described in Chapter 2). 
• The costs of EDI software, hardware and monthly Value-added network 
(VAN) connection fees have rendered EDI cost-prohibitive to most small 
and medium-sized companies (Greenstein and Feinman, 2000: 102). 
The previous paragraph outlines some of the disadvantages of EDI, which have 
probably detracted from its wider use between trading partners.. With the advent 
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of the Internet, a mechanism for using EDI standards on the Internet became 
possible (without, inter alia, the need for expensive leased lines). Open EDI 
refers to using EDI on the Internet. Extensible Markup Language (XML) is 
considered an important tool in this context because of its flexibility in creating 
and manipulating data elements (Schneider and Perry, 2001 :331-345). 
The Electronic Data Interchange-Internet Integration (EDIINT) standard defines 
the use of encryption and digital certificates to secure Open EDI (Greenstein and 
Feinman, 2000: 117). 
Thus, a more accessible tool, XML, could be used by developers at each end. 
Further, since a concomitant standard for ensuring security also became 
available, security requirements could be addressed. 
EDI web browser packages provide client software for connecting to EDI trading 
partners. Web forms are translated (to ASC X12 format) using software such as 
IBM's Information Exchange. Typically, a repository of web forms is available 
through a VAN. The forms may be customised by individual firms. 
(Greenstein and Feinman, 2000: 123). 
It may be deduced from the above that both EDI and Open EDI are open to an 
endless variety of customisable forms. Further, neither makes any provision for 
discovering trading partners and establishing trading partner agreements 
electronically. Also, each two trading partners would have to individually 
negotiate the means to ensure interoperability at various levels. These 
deficiencies - and others - are addressed by ebXML, which is discussed in the 
next section. 
3.2. Electronic Business Extensible Markup Language 
(ebXML) 
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Unless otherwise referenced, the material in this section comes from 
UN/CEFACT and OASIS1•2•5•6•7•9,to,11 , 2001. 
In May 2001, the technical architecture for a new electronic business de jure 
standard was released. It is called ebXML1 (electronic business XML). ebXML is 
a suite of specifications for electronic business data exchange, developed by the 
United Nations body for Trade Facilitation and Electronic Business 
(UNICEF ACT) and the Organization for the Advancement of Structured 
Information Standards (OASIS), together with international industry groups. 
ebXML is built on the following published goals: 
• To provide an infrastructure that ensures data communication 
interoperability; 
• To provide a semantics framework- as is the case with EDI 
specifications - that ensures commercial interoperability; and 
• To provide a mechanism that allows prospective trading partners to 
discover each other, create collaboration agreements and conduct 
business with each other, over the Internet. 
It is envisaged that all of these operations be performed automatically, with 
minimal, if any, human intervention. 
The ultimate goal is to provide an XML-based open framework for creating a 
"single global electronic market". There are three categories of ebXML task team 
deliverables (available from the website indicated in footnote 1) from which 
additional information may be obtained: 
o Technical Specifications: These specify components of the ebXML 
System and conform to the ebXML Requirements document. 
o Technical Reports: These are either guidelines or catalogues. 
o White Papers: These constitute a "snapshot" of on-going work within a 
Project Team. 
1 http://www.ebxml.org/ 
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The content of the above literature appears to support Choudury' s classification 
(previous chapter). The "electronic market" concept in ebXML purports to 
enable collaboration for the common good (as opposed to competitive gain). It 
goes beyond supporting established value chains, allowing both buyers and 
sellers to trade in a many-to-many fashion with other buyers and sellers, as 
depicted in Choudury's "multilateral electronic market" IOIS. 
The ebXML specifications utilize XML as a platform for the following reasons: 
• XML is an open and freely available document from the World Wide 
Web Consortium (W3C); 
• It allows parties to exchange structured data, as is kept in databases, over 
the Internet; 
• It supports Unicode that enables the display and exchange of various 
languages in the world; and 
• It is supported by prominent information technology companies, such as 
Microsoft and IBM. 
ebXML is also globally supported by standards organizations, e.g. ASC X12, the 
Data Interchange Standards Association, PeopleSoft Incorporated, XML/EDI 
Group, GENCOD-EAN France and XMLGlobal. Further, ebXML is based on 
Internet technologies using open standards such as: HTTP, TCP/IP, MIME, 
SMTP, FTP, UML, and XML. It is thus vendor-neutral. It can also be 
implemented and deployed on most computing platforms, using most 
programming languages. The designers anticipate that businesses of all sizes will 
adopt ebXML for reasons of lower development cost, flexibility, and ease of use. 
From the perspective of interoperability, specifically security interoperability 
(between trading partners), the actual ebXML architecture is examined in the 
following section. The subsequent section (3.2.2.) examines relevant aspects in 
the actual use of ebXML. 
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3.2. 1. Architectural overview 
ebXML is an end-to-end solution, but is intended to be modular in nature. It is 
envisaged by the designers that ebXML compliant "off-the-shelf' software will 
become available in the near future. 
As mentioned in the goals of ebXML, in the previous section, in order for 
enterprises to conduct electronic business with each other, they must: 
• Discover each other and the products and services they have to offer. 
• Determine which shared business processes, and associated document 
exchanges, to use for obtaining products or services from each other. 
• Determine the contact points and form of communication for the 
exchange of information. 
• Agree on the contractual terms on the above chosen processes and 
associated information. 
Thereafter, they should be able to exchange information and services (in an 
automated fashion) in accordance with these agreements. 
The design is aimed at providing the infrastructure to ensure data communication 
interoperability, by way of: 
• a standard message transport mechanism with a well defined interface, 
packaging rules, and a predictable delivery and security model; and 
• a business service interlace that handles incoming and outgoing messages 
at either end of the transport 
It also provides a semantics framework to ensure commercial interoperability, 
comprising: 
• a metamodel for defining business process and information models; 
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• a set of re-useable business logic based on core components that reflect 
common business processes and XML vocabularies; and 
• a process for defining actual message structures and definitions as they 
relate to the activities in the business process model. 
The third goal - the mechanism to allow enterprises to find each other, agree to 
establish business relationships, and conduct business - is provided through: 
• a shared repository where enterprises can register and discover each 
other's business services via partner profile information; 
• a process for defining and agreeing to a formal Collaboration Protocol 
Agreement (CPA), if required; and 
• a shared repository for company profiles, business process models and 
related message structures. 
The essential ebXML architecture is depicted in the diagram (Figure 2) below: 
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FIGURE 2: ebXML TECHNICAL ARCHITECTURE (UN/CEFACT AND 
OASIS1, 2001) 
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The technical architecture is composed of five main areas of emphasis (see 
Figure 2): 
• Business Process and Information Model; 
• Company Profiles; 
• Messaging Services; 
• Registry & Repository; and 
• Collaborative Partner Agreements. 
The Business Process models define how business processes are described. 
Business Processes can be represented using modelling tools. The specification 
for business process definition enables an organization to express its business 
processes so that they are understandable by other organizations. This enables the 
integration of business processes within a single company, or between different 
companies. 
The Information models define reusable components that can be applied in a 
standard way within a business context. These Core Components are defined 
using identity items that are common across all businesses. This enables users to 
define data that is meaningful to their business while maintaining interoperability 
with other business applications. 
The ebXML Messaging Service specification defines the set of services and 
protocols that enables electronic business applications to exchange data. The 
specification allows any application-level protocol to be used. These can include 
common protocols such as SMTP, HTTP, and FTP. Well established 
cryptographic techniques can be used to implement strong security. For example, 
secure protocols such as HTTPS can be used to ensure confidentiality. In 
addition, digital signatures can be applied to individual messages or a group of 
related messages to ensure authenticity. 
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The Registry and Repository provides a number of key functions. For the user 
(application) it stores company profiles and Trading Partner specifications. These 
give access to specific business processes and information models to allow 
updates and additions over time. For the application developer it will store not 
only the final business process definitions, but also a library of core components. 
The Collaborative Partner Agreement (CPA) defines the technical parameters of 
the Collaborative Partner Profiles (CPP). This captures critical information for 
communications between applications and business processes and also records 
specific technical parameters for conducting electronic business. 
3.2.2. Using ebXML 
Using ebXML is essentially a four step process, as illustrated in Figure 3 below. 
These activities may be performed in slightly different sequences and with 
different scope and focus, depending on the actual context. The activities 
considered important are: 
1. The design and registration of business processes and information 
models. 
a. The implementer browses the repository for appropriate business 
processes, or for the process the intended partner is registered to 
support. 
2. The Implementation of business service interfaces and registering 
Collaborative Partner Profiles. 
a. The implementer buys, builds, or configures application(s) 
capable of participating in the selected business process. 
b. The implementer registers his (software's) capability to 
participate, in the form of a Collaborative Partner Profile (CPP). 
3. The negotiation of technical details and/or functional overrides, and the 
drawing up of the result in the form of a CPA between the two parties . 
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a. Parties optionally register the CPA on the ebXML Registry. 
4. The sending and receiving of ebXML messages containing ebXML 
business documents, over the ebXML Messaging Service. 
[ 4 easy steps to ~bXML 
1. Design and 
tcgirltr 
Jll'0\1($$ 
l . Implanent 
and r~gjsh:r 
pfl)file 
J. Optionally 
n<g-Otiate 
a:grccmmt 
4. Conduct 
chXML 
bu.rinc:u 
Co~yB 
FIGURE 3: USING ebXML (UN/CEFACT AND OASIS1, 2001) 
In this section, the mechanism of how ebXML is expected to function was 
outlined. The following section examines how ebXML makes provision for 
security interoperability. 
3.2.3. ebXML and Security 
eXML messages are specified as Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) 
Objects. While the Messaging Service specification recommends the use of XML 
digital signatures (still under development by the W3C/IETF) and Secure IP 
(IPSec), the Message Service Handler in the specification currently supports only 
persistent XML digital signatures. Secure Multimedia Internet Mail Extensions 
(S/MIME) is recommended for ebXML payloads (SOAP messages). 
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The ebXML specifications identify the more obvious risks, but recommend that 
each trading partner uses BS7799/IS017799 to complete a thorough risk analysis 
for security management purposes. A policy-based framework and a layering 
architecture for security are recommended. 
A White Paper on ebXML security concludes that in the current version of the 
CPP/CPA, the specification of security elements is limited. It recommends that 
XML schema be utilized for more effectively expressing security attributes. 
Currently, the security characteristic is a single XML element that contains 
attributes with Boolean values indicating whether or not a security attribute has 
been addressed. The paper concedes that it would be more appropriate to 
indicate the type of the security characteristic with a reference id to include on 
lower elements (like the transport element), which contain the details, such as the 
protocol. Thus, actual security control parameters have not yet been addressed 
effectively to take into account the required granularity. 
3.3. Conclusion 
This chapter identified and described EDI and its successor, ebXML. ebXML is 
the standard upon which most future B2B IOISs are likely to be built. However, 
the standard currently lacks clear specifications on exactly which security 
implementations may be used to ensure interoperability. It recommends the use 
of IPSec and XML Digital Signatures, but provides very limited specification 
detail and no guidance on how this should be implemented, except that the 
details should be elaborated in lower security elements in the relevant XML 
schemas. 
However, the components which make up the ebXML architecture have been 
derived from the collaborative efforts of representatives of most major software 
industry players, and will thus almost certainly become the common modus 
operandi for setting up B2B IOISs. 
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Chapter 4 
Integrating 828 1018 Security Implementations: Exactly what 
is available? 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter deals with security mechanisms (controls) to realize information 
security services, which in tum are required to counter specific information 
security threats. The intention of this chapter is not to provide an in-depth 
analysis of the practice of computer security, or of network security. It does not 
deal with security policies, risk analysis, general security design, monitoring, 
logging, auditing, applying forensic analyses, or damage control - all part of the 
process of computer security (Wadlow, 2000: vii-xi). Further, physical security, 
denial-of-service vulnerabilities (including virus, worm and Trojan attacks), 
operating system hardening, and network segmentation (using Virtual LANs, 
VLANs), will also not be considered. 
The overall context of this chapter is information security in TCP/IP (Intemet-
capable) networks, specifically as it relates to B2B IOISs. The main thread of 
this chapter is intended to be an investigation of which technologies are available 
for providing interoperable security in B2B IOISs. This information will be used, 
in Chapter 5, to arrive at a suggested framework based on the most suitable of 
these technologies. 
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It will be demonstrated in subsequent sections that encryption is (currently) at the 
heart of security services on the Internet; thus, its implications for B2B IOISs 
will be examined first. 
4.2. Encryption 
As indicated in Chapter 1, encryption is generally used to ensure confidentiality. 
In a B2B IOIS context, the other security services - integrity, authentication, 
access control and non-repudiation - are essential, but must also be implemented 
to ensure interoperability between the connected systems. Encryption and the 
various ways in which it may be implemented are therefore discussed in terms of 
achieving this aim. 
4.2. 1. Symmetric Encryption 
Recall from the definition of encryption in Chapter 1 that plaintext (P) is 
encrypted to yield a ciphertext (C), which in turn is decrypted to yield P. A 
symmetric cryptographic algorithm is used to apply a secret key (K) - known 
only to the sender and receiver - to both the encryption and decryption 
transformations. Symmetric encryption may generally be depicted as follows: 
• EK (P) = C for encryption, and 
• EK (C) = P for decryption. 
(Inter alia, Hassler, 2001:15-16). 
An alternative notation also used in this document is: 
• E (P, K) = C for encryption, and 
• E (C, K) = P for decryption. 
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4.2. 1. 1. Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 
The new de jure standard for symmetric encryption is the Advanced Encryption 
Standard (AES). The significance and relevance of AES will only be examined 
in the light of its implications for B2B IOIS security. The following is an attempt 
to summarize the actual AES formal specification (NIST1: 4-50): 
AES/Rijndael algorithm is a symmetric block cipher that can process data blocks 
of 128 bits, using cipher keys with lengths of 128, 192, and 256 bits. It was 
designed to accommodate additional block sizes and key lengths, but these were 
not adopted in the standard. The algorithm variants may therefore be referred to 
as "AES-128", "AES-192", and "AES-256". The previous standard, Data 
Encryption Standard (DES), processed 64-bit data blocks with a key length of 56 
bits. The number of rounds varies according to the key length; it is therefore 10, 
12 or 14, respectively. The basic unit for processing in the AES algorithm is a 
byte. The input, output and cipher key bit sequences are processed as arrays of 
bytes. 
Rijndael was adjudged to be the best overall algorithm for AES for the following 
primary reasons (N echvatal et al, 2000: 13-16): 
(All the security and algorithmic concepts mentioned in the list are discussed in 
the reference). 
• It appears to be a consistently very good performer in both hardware and 
software across a wide range of computing environments in both 
feedback and non-feedback modes. 
• Its key set-up time is excellent, and its key agility is good. 
• It has very low memory requirements, which make it very well suited to 
restricted-space environments. It also demonstrates excellent performance 
in this situation. 
• Rijndael's operations are among the easiest to defend against power and 
timing attacks, without significantly impacting on its performance. 
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• Rijndael is designed with some flexibility in terms of block and key sizes, 
and the algorithm can accommodate alterations in the number of rounds 
used. 
• Rijndael' s internal round structure appears to have good potential to 
benefit from instruction-level parallelism. 
• Although future computing platforms are unpredictable, to some extent, 
as is the wide range of environments in which AES will be implemented, 
"Rijndael's combination of security, performance, efficiency, 
implementability, and flexibility make it an appropriate selection for AES 
for use in the technology of today and in the future". 
It seems, therefore, quite clear that if symmetric encryption is to be used as part 
of the overall solution, that the algorithm of choice should be AES. 
4.2. 1.2. Shortcomings of Symmetric Encryption for 828 10/S 
A central consideration in the use of AES - as it has been for its predecessors - is 
the distribution of the secret key that is used for generating the key schedule. For 
decryption, the inverse cipher algorithm must be employed on the receiver's end, 
using the same secret key. Various key exchange protocols are available, which 
include key transport protocols and key agreement protocols (Hassler, 2001: 51). 
The intrinsic vulnerabilities associated with key distribution (including frequency 
of changing keys) are amplified as the number of users increases. For n users, the 
number of keys is given by n(n + 1)/2 (Pfleeger, 1997:129). 
Another problem is: deciding how often to change a key. This dilemma exists 
because of (a) the necessity to change keys regularly to reduce the amount of 
ciphertext available from one key (to reduce the amount the cryptanalyst has to 
work with), and (b) the need to keep keys, to resolve disputes years after a 
contract has been signed (Ibid). 
A possible solution to these problems resides in the use of a central key 
distribution centre (KDC). 
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4.2.1.3. Central Key Distribution Centres (KDCs) 
Using a KDC involves the following steps, as described by Pfleeger ( 1997: 131-
132): 
• User A sends to the central key distribution service (repository) a request: 
(A,B,IA), where A and B are the identities of the recipients (of messages), 
and IA is the unique identifier for A's requests (if more are possible). This 
information need not be encrypted. 
• The repository generates a secret key KAB, encrypts it with a unique 
second key KA (shared by the repository and A) and sends it to A as 
E(IA,B,KAB,E((KAB,A),KB),KA), which is 
o The unique message identifier for this key request (IA), 
o B's identification (B), 
o A key for communication between A and B (KAB) and 
o A string containing his identification and the same key, encrypted 
under the distribution centre's key shared with B, (i.e. KB) thus: 
E(KAB,A),KB. 
o A cannot decrypt this, but can send it to B. 
• A sends E((KAB,A), KB), to B who is able to decrypt it with KB (shared by 
the repository and B). 
A key (KAB) may thus be successfully distributed to both A and B, without A and 
B having initially shared a key. 
The advantages of this approach include (Ibid): 
• The number of keys is reduced. Adding a new user requires only one key 
shared with the key distribution centre. 
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• Users can change keys as often as they like, simply lodging the new key 
request with the distribution centre. 
• No prior private exchange between users before key registration is 
required. 
There are, however, disadvantages to this approach. Pfleeger (Ibid) lists the 
following: 
• Flexibility is reduced, since the server has to be used for all changes. 
• The key distribution centre must be constantly available. 
• The key distribution centre is a potential bottleneck. 
• The key distribution centre is a target for attack, disablement or 
impersonation. 
KDCs are similarly discussed by Kaufman et al (1995:189-190, 243). Additional 
shortcomings of KDCs are discussed in the next section. 
4.2. 1.4. Shortcomings of KDCs for 828 10/S 
The steps outlined above presuppose that the KDC and A share a secret key (KA). 
This is also the case for the KDC and B (where KB is shared). A glaring problem 
with this approach is: How are KA and KB distributed to A and B without risk? 
Asymmetric encryption is an attempt to address this particular problem. 
4.2.3. Asymmetric Encryption 
In asymmetric encryption algorithms - also called public key algorithms - two 
algorithmically-related keys are used (Gollmann, 1999:212). 
The following information on public-key cryptography is based on the following 
source: Greenstein and Feinman, 2000:235-240. 
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The public-key cryptography concept was promulgated by Diffie and Hellman in 
1976. It allows a sender and receiver to generate a shared, secret key over an 
insecure telecommunications line, thereby addressing the problem of distributing 
secret keys. Their method, as well the RSA method (developed by Rivest, 
Shamir and Adelman), will be explained below. 
4.2.3. 1. The Diffie-Hellman Algorithm 
This algorithm is based on the following steps: 
1. The sender determines a secret value a. 
2. a is used to derive another value A, which is made public. 
3. Similarly, the receiver determines a secret value b, from which another value B 
is derived, and made public. 
4. The Diffie-Hellman algorithm is used to calculate a secret key corresponding 
to the key pairs (a, B) and (b, A). 
It is computationally infeasible to determine a and b from simply knowing A and 
B, respectively. The secret key is thus shared, without it having been transmitted 
to A andB. 
4.2.3.2. Shortcomings of the Diffie-Hellman Algorithm 
The Diffie-Hellman algorithm is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks, where 
the public values A and B could be replaced by an interceptor's own public 
value, Z. The sender and the receiver will then generate (a, Z) and (b, Z), 
respectively. The sender and receiver would be unaware that they do not share a 
secret key. The interceptor would then generate (z, A) and (z, B) to decrypt 
messages from A and B. The messages could be altered and then be forwarded to 
the receiver. 
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To overcome this problem, a means for ensuring authentication of the sender and 
message integrity is therefore required. 
4.2.3.3. The RSA Algorithm 
The RSA algorithm is based on key pairs (a public key and a private key) 
generated from a one-way function with an intentional "trap-door". It does not 
rely on anyone else's public values; therefore, it is not vulnerable to man-in-the-
middle attacks. The trap-door allows for reverse computation with the use of a 
precise piece of information. However, for the cryptanalyst, deriving the private 
key by reverse computation requires the factoring of large prime numbers, which 
makes the process extremely difficult. 
4.2.3.4. Shortcomings of the RSA Algorithm 
The following are noted shortcomings (for both RSA and Diffie-Hellman 
asymmetric cryptography): 
• The sender may use her private key to encrypt a message and the receiver 
would use the sender's public key to decrypt it. However, anyone with the 
sender's public key may decrypt the message. Thus, message 
confidentiality may be compromised. 
• The sender may use the receiver's public key to encrypt the message and 
the receiver would use his own private key to decrypt it. Here, the 
authentication of the sender presents a problem, since the message could 
have come from anyone who has the receiver's public key. 
• Public key cryptography (as exemplified by the RSA algorithm) is not as 
computationally efficient as symmetric encryption. For example, Digital 
Encryption Standard (DES) - the previous symmetric encryption standard 
- is 100 times and 1000 times faster than RSA on software and hardware 
platforms, respectively. 
53 
To overcome the latter problem, Greenstein and Feinman describe replacing 
RSA with DES. The message is encrypted with DES. The smaller (than the 
message) DES key, used to encrypt the message, is then encrypted with the 
receiver's public key. Both the encrypted message and the encrypted key are sent 
to the receiver. Only the receiver's private key can decrypt the DES key, which is 
necessary for decryption of the message. Thus, message confidentiality is 
ensured. (Ibid:238-241). 
In the explanation above, it seems evident that DES could be replaced with AES, 
with the same results. Although AES has larger keys, AES is much faster than 
DES. However, authentication of the sender remains a problem. 
One way in which authentication of the sender can be ensured, is to use digital 
signatures, which utilize hashing algorithms. (Another way is by using digital 
certificates which will be discussed in a subsequent section). Digital signatures 
are discussed in the next section. 
4.2.3. Digital signatures 
Digital signatures bind the message sender with the exact contents of the 
message. This provides both integrity and sender authentication. Digital 
signatures make use of hash algorithms with one-way functions, which transform 
a message into a message digest or hash. Unlike with other encryption, message 
digests are not intended to be decrypted. (Ibid:242). 
The hashed message is encrypted with the sender's private key (sender 
authentication). The encrypted message digest together with the original, 
unencrypted message is sent to the receiver. The receiver's software uses the 
original, unencrypted message to create the same message digest, by using the 
same hashing algorithm. The encrypted message digest is then decrypted with the 
54 
sender's public key. The two message digests are compared. If they are identical, 
the digital signature is considered valid and integrity of the message has been 
preserved. This description, depicted in Figure 4, applies in particular to MD5 
(an example of a hash algorithm). 
Sending 
FIGURE 4. USING DIGITAL SIGNATURES (SCHNEIDER AND PERRY, 
2001:225). 
Examples of hash algorithms are: SHA-1 (developed by NIST for NSA) and 
MD5 (from RSA), and Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA), which is defined by 
NIST's Digital Signature Standard (DSS). 
(King et al 2001: 354-358). 
4.2.3. 1. Shortcomings of Digital Signatures 
Digital signatures still appear to have a flaw: Unless the receiver has personally 
taken possession of the sender's public key directly from him/her, simply having 
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the sender's public key may still not irrevocably attest to the sender's identity. 
(Ibid). 
Digital certificates, while not a panacea, seem to address this problem. 
4.2.4. Digital certificates 
Digital certificates are managed by trusted third parties, called Certification 
Authorities (CAs). CAs make public keys available to interested parties, but also 
bind a public key to a particular name. Further, public key certificates are 
digitally signed by the CA. These digital certificates are considered legally 
binding. (Hassler, 2001:41). 
The sender's public key is housed in the certificate. The CA acts as a notary 
public, vouching for the sender as the owner of the public key. The certificate has 
similar characteristics to a passport: 
• It is unique to the individual and carries his/her unique identification 
details 
• It is issued by a trusted third party 
• It is universally accepted as a means of identification 
• It has a fixed validity period 
• It is tamper-proof. 
(King et al, 2001: 359). 
These characteristics are defined by digital certificate standards. Several such 
standards have been described, but the "most advanced and widespread 
specifications" are defined by the X.509 Working Group (PKIX) of the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF). (Also very influential in this area is the Public 
Key Cryptography Standard (PKCS) from RSA Security Laboratories). The 
collection of components and procedures required to support the management of 
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digital certificates is known as Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Hence, the PKIX 
standard (RFC 2459), defines the PKI X.509 version 3 certificate. 
An X.509 version 3 certificate contains specific fields such as: Issuer CA name, 
subject name and validity period; it also contains the subject's public key (as a 
delimited hexadecimal text field). The CA digitally signs the certificate before 
sending it to the subject. 
The following services are supported by the use of digital certificates: 
• Web authentication and channel privacy: This is effected using protocols 
such as Netscape's Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and the IETF's Transport 
Layer Security (TSL). These protocols will be examined later. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Signed and encrypted messaging: Certificates and associated keys can be 
used to encrypt and digitally sign e-mail messages; this is implemented in 
protocols such as Secure Multi-purpose Internet Mail Extensions 
(S/MIME). 
Signed transactions and form signing: Here digital signatures are used . 
Network operating system, host and mainframe authentication: 
Certificates, such as Kerberos certificates, are used to authenticate users. 
This will also be examined later. 
Remote access: The distributed employee work force can connect to 
corporate resources and be authenticated using certificates 
Virtual Private Networks: This uses an encrypted tunnel to allow secure 
transmission along the Internet infrastructure. 
File Encryption: This is for authenticating users allowed access to 
sensitive data. 
Software code signing: This is to ensure that software (especially 
updates) are being provided by trusted sources. 
(King et al, 2001:347-350). 
A tutorial by Hunt (2001: 1460-14 71) provides a detailed account of the operation 
of PKI, the issues surrounding its operation and the problems that need to be 
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addressed to ensure its widespread use. The following section is a brief overview 
of PK.I. 
4.2.5. Public Key Infrastructure (PK/) 
The following explanation is based mainly on material from Greenstein and 
Feinman (2000:248-254) and Hunt (2001:1460-1471). 
A PK.I system consists of three main functional parts: 
• Certification authorities (CAs): Trusted entities that issue and revoke 
public key certificates and certificate revocation lists (CRLs). 
• Registration Authorities (RAs): Entities that are trusted by CAs to 
register or attest to the identities of CA users. 
• Certificate Repositories (CRs): Publicly accessible databases that hold 
information such as certificates and CRLs. 
Hunt adds two further components: A security policy and PK.I-enabled 
applications (Hunt 2001: 1461). 
A distributed hierarchy of CAs and RAs generally exists to ensure scalability and 
reliability, with the "Root CA" at the apex. Cross certification is the process by 
which CAs agree to recognize one another's authority. When a certificate has 
been revoked (due to it having been compromised or lost), it is added to the CRL 
for the CA. Various levels of certificates exist, based on the level of 
authentication the owner wishes to convey with his messages. 
This protocol uses the concept of one "vouching for" (attesting to the identity of) 
someone else in a chain-of-authentication hierarchy. Each consecutive 
authenticator trusts the authenticator immediately above it. 
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An entity at the top of the hierarchy selects a key pair, publishes the public part 
and retains the private part. An entity immediately below creates a public key 
pair, puts the public key in a message together with its identity, and passes the 
message securely to the top-level entity above it. The top-level entity signs it, by 
creating a hash value of the message and then encrypting the message and the 
hash with its private key. By signing the message, the top-level entity affirms that 
the public key and the identity are for the same lower-level entity. The message 
is the latter's certificate. 
The next-level entity/entities also create messages with their public keys. The 
entity at the immediate-higher level hashes each message, signs it with her 
private key and appends its own certificate, and returns the certificates. Thus, for 
any entity lower down the hierarchy, a certificate consists of its certificate 
combined with all the certificates of the entities hierarchically above it. 
4.2.5.1. The (Technical) Suitability of PK/ for 82810/Ss 
At this juncture, it is apparent that PKI provides the most appropriate answers to 
technical problems in respect of B2B IOIS security. The main (technical) 
disadvantage is that it relies on trusting the topmost entity in the certificate 
hierarchy (Pfleeger, 1997: 135-140). The major advantage of PKI is that it 
provides secrecy, authentication, integrity and non-repudiation (Hunt, 2001: 
1460). 
PKI-enabled applications are used to implement, inter alia, Secure Sockets Layer 
(SSL), Secure MIME (S/MIME) and Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) 
(Ibid: 1462). Some of these are discussed below in order to identify the most 
appropriate for B2B IOISs. 
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4.2.6. Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and Secure HTTP (SHTTP) 
SSL is the predominant protocol for providing security services for HTTP traffic, 
although it is application-independent. Both Microsoft's Private Communicating 
Transport protocol (PCT) and SHTTP have been deprecated in favour of SSL in 
the popular browsers (Oppliger, 2000: 132-133). 
Canavan (2001:80-82) states the following in respect of SSL: 
• It was developed by Netscape to protect information being transmitted on 
the Internet, e.g. in the sending of credit card information 
• It utilizes both symmetric and asymmetric encryption 
• It generally establishes a secure HTTP encrypted tunnel between a client 
and a server; this is referred to as secure HTTP or HTTPS. 
• Confidentiality is maintained by encryption and integrity is established 
with hashing algorithms. 
• To set up SSL, both sides exchange random numbers. The server 
authenticates itself by sending a CA-signed digital certificate. It also 
sends a session ID. The browser client creates a pre_master_secret key, 
which it encrypts with the server's public key and transmits it to the 
server. Then both sides generate a session key using the 
pre_master_secret and random numbers. The session key is used to 
encrypt all messages between the client and the server, for the duration of 
the session. 
• The switch-over to symmetric encryption creates much less overhead. 
• SSL is connection-oriented and operates at the transport level. 
• An alternative to SSL is secure HTTP (SHTTP) developed by Enterprise 
Integration Technologies. The latter is transaction-oriented and operates 
at the application level (of the OSI Reference Model); each individual 
message is encrypted. 
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• SSL may be used for other TCP/IP suite protocols, such as FTP and 
TELNET, while SHTTP is designed only for HTTP. Hence, SHTTP is 
very rarely used, while all major browsers support HTTPS. 
• SSL requires a PK.I for optimum efficiency. 
SSLv3 (SSL, version 3, also known as Transport Layer Security or TLS) is the 
current IETF standard (Hunt, 2001:1466). 
4.2.6.1. Shortcomings of SSL for 82810/S 
Greenstein and Feinman (2000: 297), state that SSL with digital certificates are 
not commonly used. 
SSL diminishes network throughput significantly, as cryptographic processing is 
extremely CPU-intensive. Canavan (2001:80-82) cites a 1999 Sun Week study in 
which a Sun 450 Server is able to handle 500 connections per second, which 
drops to 3 transactions per second when SSL is employed. 
Further, SSL does not protect against traffic analysis. The source and destination 
IP addresses and TCP port numbers and volume of transmitted data is 
unencrypted. This allows an interceptor to determine which parties are 
interacting, the types of services they are using, and even information about 
business and personal relationships (Oppliger, 2000: 134). 
The following section examines the feasibility of using Kerberos in the B2B 
IOIS context. 
4.2. 7. Kerberos 
The following summarizes the salient points about implementing Kerberos as a 
cryptographic option (Phaltankar 2000: 149-152): 
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• It was originally designed at MIT as part of the Athena project; the latest 
version (5) is documented in RFC 1510. 
• It is used for authentication and access control, but avoids using 
passwords on a clear channel. 
• The user data is currently encrypted using DES. (It seems fair to speculate 
that later implementations could use AES). 
The following is a simplified explanation of Kerberos operation (Kana van, 2001: 
72-78): 
o Step 1. The client creates a request to send to the Kerberos server. 
The client, using his/her own private key, digitally signs the 
request. 
o Step2. The digitally signed request is then encrypted using the 
Kerberos server's public key. 
o Step 3. This is sent to the Kerberos server. 
o Step 4. The Kerberos server uses its private key to decrypt the 
message. It then uses the sender's public key to verify the digital 
signature of the sender. All authorized users have public keys in 
the database of the trusted server. 
o Step 5. If the client has access authorization, then the server sends 
identical session tickets to both the client and the server providing 
the services. For this, the respective public keys of the client and 
the server are used. 
o Step 6. Both the client and the server decrypt the session tickets 
using their respective private keys. The tickets could also be 
digitally signed by the Kerberos server to verify the source of the 
tickets. 
o Step 7. The client then sends a copy of its ticket to the server 
(providing the services), encrypted with the server's public key. 
o Step 8. When the server receives the encrypted ticket from the 
client, it decrypts it with its own private key. It matches this ticket 
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with the one received from the Kerberos server. If they match, the 
connection is established. 
o Step 9. The systems can encrypt the communication using either 
the session key or the client's public key, or they can use no 
encryption at all. 
These steps are repeated for each new service. 
4.2. 7. 1. The Suitability of Kerberos for 828 10/S 
The following are advantages of Kerberos: 
• No password information is sent over the network 
• User access to all applications is controlled by the user's profile. 
Phaltankar (2000: 149-151) 
• While PKis rely on CRLs to remove authorization for an individual or 
entity, both revocation and authentication can be done immediately with 
Kerberos. 
• Like a PKI, Kerberos key exchange relies upon public key cryptography 
and digital signature technology. It uses both secret key and public key 
cryptography. It uses a single central server as the trusted third party, 
based on the premise that it is impossible to secure all the servers in a 
distributed computing environment, but that it is possible to truly secure a 
single server. Hence, it is more secure to control all network access from 
one single secure server. 
(Kanavan, 2000: 77-78). 
The following are disadvantages of Kerberos: 
• Kerberos is a single sign-on (SSO) authentication scheme. Every 
Windows 2000 domain controller is a KDC. Thus it seems expedient to 
simply plan more domains, in order to delegate Kerberos control to each 
domain controller (for the sake of scalability). However, each application 
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still has to be "Kerberized". An added problem is the changing of 
passwords of the centralized application and that of the application itself. 
For UNIX, The MIT Kerberos distribution includes a standard 
replacement for the login program. 
(King et al, 2001:328). 
• There are several extensions to the basic Kerberos authentication system 
developed by MIT, e.g. Yaksha, SESAME (secure European system for 
applications in a multi-vendor environment) and DCE (Distributed 
Computing Environment) developed by the Open Group (the 1996 
consolidation of the Open Systems Foundation (OSF) and X/Open 
Company Ltd., which includes, among others, technology vendors IBM, 
Microsoft and DEC). In Microsoft's Windows 2000 (NT 5), Kerberos is 
used as a single sign-on (SSO) system to log into the NT domain (as 
mentioned above). The domain controller acts as the Kerberos 
Distribution Centre (KDC), which includes the Authentication Server 
(AS) and the Ticket Granting Server (TGS). Kerberos may also be used 
to feed the Security Association (SA) database of a corresponding IPSec 
implementation. Microsoft enhancements are similar to SESAME and 
DCE enhancements, but are not compatible with them. 
Oppliger (2000: 123-124) 
• All services have to be "Kerberized" on both the client and server sides. 
This requires the source code for the applications. 
• The Kerberos server represents a single point of failure.If the Kerberos 
server is compromised, the network is compromised. 
• Workstations have to be single-user; multiple users would allow 
certificates to be stolen. 
(Phaltankar (2000: 151) 
• A major disadvantage is denial-of-service attacks (even simply flooding 
the server with requests or flooding the network with traffic). Kerberos 
can be susceptible to replay attacks. This can be avoided by the use of 
timestamps. 
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• Also, the server is prone to scalability issues - as the number of 
workstations and resources increase, so the number of requests will 
increase. Ultimately, the server capacity would no longer be able to grow. 
Thus for bigger networks, such as the Internet, PKI with digital 
certificates is better suited. 
(Kanavan, 2000: 77-78). 
While Kerberos seems an equitable solution for intra-organizational networks, it 
seems to present many shortcomings for IOISs. 
4.2.8. Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) 
In terms of Business-to-Business (B2B) e-commerce (extranets), trading partners 
generally consider Virtual Private Network (VPN) implementation as a core 
security option. This option also applies to remote users connecting to a company 
intranet. (Oppliger, 2000:96-97). 
VPNs provide encryption on an untrusted network. The encryption is either 
node-to-node (or link-to-link) or end-to-end encryption. 
Node-to-node encryption involves the data link layer of the OSI Reference 
Model. A packet has to be decrypted and re-encrypted at each hop along the 
route, to allow the routing information at layer three to be read. This implies that 
every node must have compatible devices and key management processes. 
End-to-end encryption implies that encryption is done at the sending node and 
decrypted at the receiving node. It involves encryption at the upper layers of the 
OSI Model. The drawback here is that the higher up the encryption is on the 
protocol stack, the more transmission information (e.g. TCP/IP ports) is 
contained unencrypted in a packet. 
(Canavan, 2001:201-203) 
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In selecting VPN solutions, a major interoperability factor is the VPN protocol. 
This is considered in the section below. 
4.2.8.1. VPN Protocols 
Common VPN protocols may be listed as: 
• Point-to-point Tunnelling Protocol (PPTP); 
• Layer 2 Tunnelling Protocol (L2TP); 
• Internet Security Protocol (IPSec); and 
• SOCKS. 
(lbid:205) 
A brief summary of each protocol is provided in the following sections. 
Unless otherwise indicated, the material is based on Canavan (2001:205-
208). 
(a) PPTP 
• Supported by Microsoft, it is one of the earliest VPN protocols 
• It is used for connecting remote clients to servers; on Windows 
computers, the underlying services are referred to as Remote Access 
Services (RAS). 
• It works at layer 2 of the OSI model and is an extension of the Point-
to-Point protocol (PPP). 
• It encapsulates PPP packets using a modified version of the Generic 
Routing Encapsulation (GRE) protocol; GRE makes it able to 
encapsulate IP, IPX and NetBEUI. However, firewalls may not permit 
the GRE service. (King et al, 2001:197). 
• The actual encryption is either by means of CHAP (Challenge 
Handshake Authentication Protocol, which uses RSA's MD4 for 
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hashing and RC4 for symmetric encryption) or MS-CHAP 
(Microsoft's version of CHAP, which is the default setting) 
• The server sends the client a challenge which is used by the client to 
encrypt the client's password. The password is returned to the server 
in order for the client to log in. 
• PPTP has been submitted to the IETF for standardization. 
• It is available for Linux and Windows (98 and NT). 
• It is recommended that PPTP not be used to protect sensitive data, as 
it is relatively insecure (King et al, 2001:197). 
(b) L2TP 
• This is an IETF standard that combines features from Cisco's Layer 2 
Forwarding (L2F) protocol and Microsoft's PPTP. 
• It is also an extension to the PPP and operates at layer 2. It therefore, like 
PPTP, provides node-to-node encryption. 
• It does not yet have significant deployment, and is not likely to be 
favoured over IP Sec in the future (King et al, 2001: 198). 
(c) IPSec 
• IPSec is under development by the IETF for Internet and Intranet 
implementations. 
• It operates at layer 3 (the network layer) and supports two modes: 
transport mode or tunnel mode. 
o In transport mode, it encrypts only the data (payload) of each 
packet. This provides end-to-end encryption, since the header is 
unencrypted. Although this is prone to traffic pattern analysis, the 
payload is protected. Transport mode is always used between two 
hosts (Phaltankar, 2001:202). 
o Tunnel mode encrypts the entire packet. This results in node-to-
node encryption. Each receiving device must be IPSec-compliant, 
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decrypt the packet, interpret the relevant information, re-encrypt 
it, and then forward the packet to the next device. Each receiving 
device has a public key for the sending device's digital certificate; 
the Internet Security Association and Key Management 
Protocol/Oakley (ISAKMP/Oakley) is used. Tunnel mode is 
considered more secure than transport mode. Tunnel mode is used 
between two security gateways or between a host and a security 
gateway (Phaltankar, 2001:202). 
• IPSec is not a single protocol, but a suite of protocols, which provide 
privacy, authentication and data integrity to IP packets: 
o Authentication Header (AH), for data integrity and packet data-
origin authentication (using hashed message authentication code, 
HMAC with MD5 or SHA-1); 
o Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), for packet encryption 
and/or authentication (also using HMAC with MD5 or for 
integrity and DES-CBC for encryption); and 
o Security Association (SA), which defines the security policy 
between two nodes. SAs determine which algorithms will be 
used, how keys will be exchanged (HMAC uses a secret key), and 
how often keys will be changed. Automated key management is 
generally provided by the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) algorithm, 
which is a combination of the ISAKMP/Oakley protocols, 
mentioned above. ISAKMP defines procedures and packet 
formats to establish, negotiate, modify and delete SAs. Oakley 
uses the Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm. 
King et al (2001:198-203) 
• Although designed primarily for IP version 6 (IPv6), it is being used on 
IP version 4 (IPv4) systems (Ibid). 
• Using IPSec secures both TCP and UDP applications (Oppliger, 
2000:116). 
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(d) SOCKS 
• SOCKS is an IETF protocol standard for handling TCP traffic through a 
proxy server. 
• Two versions in use are SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 (versions 4 and 5). 
Version 5 provides additional security through authentication. 
• SOCKS5 provides rudimentary firewall capabilities, by providing 
authentication of incoming and outgoing packets, as well as network 
address translation (NAT), whereby the internal network IP addresses are 
masked from external networks. 
4.2.8.2. The Suitability of VPNs for 828 10/S 
Various VPN configurations are possible, e.g. router-to-router, server-to-router, 
server-to-server, workstation-to-server, or workstation-to-router. (Canavan, 
2001:208). This makes it highly suitable for B2B IOISs. Essentially, a VPN 
creates a virtual pipe between two endpoints. Private (RFC 1918) IP addressing 
schemes for the endpoint networks can be used, without conflicting with Internet 
addresses. (Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS)2 is another technology that 
circumvents this problem and is generally used by ISPs.). 
(King et al 2001:177-215). 
VPNs provide authentication, access control, confidentiality and data integrity; 
these services are encryption-based, which is a defining feature of VPNs. VPNs 
are seen as only part of a complete security solution, protecting data streams in 
transmission between two endpoints. (Ibid: 179-180). Typically, the networks 
would be simple dial-up using PSTN, ISDN, xDSL, frame relay, ISDN or ATM. 
(Oppliger, 2000:96-98). 
2 More information on MPLS is available at www.ietf.org/html.charters/mpls-charter.html 
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The accepted standard in extranets is IPSec. (King et al, 2001:183). In fact, King 
et (Ibid: 195) contend that IPSec has "become the protocol of choice to build the 
best VPN system because it offers strong security, encryption, authentication, 
and key management". 
4.3. Conclusion 
One might therefore conclude that in B2B IOISs, 
• AES would provide optimal encryption-based security; 
• PKI provides optimal security services, as well as key distribution and 
key management services; and 
• VPNs employing IPSec, with ESP and IKE, seem to be the B2B IOIS 
deployment of choice. 
When suitably implemented, the degree of security provided by these controls 
ultimately depends on how secure the encryption algorithms are that are used for 
encrypting data and providing message digests. AES/Rijndael algorithm is 
demonstrably efficient in this regard. It seems logical that to ensure 
interoperability, the same algorithm be used for both encryption-decryption and 
hashing. 
Hunt (2001:1467) states that PKI has not enjoyed widespread deployment as a 
result of cost, complexity, lack of qualified resources and "a critical mass of 
businesses". PKis are, however, being implemented to manage VPNs. Further, 
the author points out that VPN s are standardising on IP Sec, using IKE for key 
exchange. 
It seems logical to conclude that AES will begin to play a critical role in both 
SSL/TLS (B2C networks) and VPNs (remote-user-intranet set-ups and B2B 
networks). While AES has become the symmetric encryption standard, the use 
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of PKI to circumvent secret key exchange and to ensure sender authentication, 
seems to be essential. It is very likely that AES will be used for digital signatures 
as well. 
The next chapter looks at how VPN s, using PKI, may be used to provide a 
framework for interoperability between security systems of trading partners in a 
B2B IOIS. 
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Chapter 5 
A Proposed Framework for Optimal Interoperability 
5.1 Introduction 
Security interoperability implies that the security mechanisms underlying the 
network activity (e.g. online transactions) taking place between trading partners 
have sufficient commonality to allow appropriate parts of the information 
systems of each trading partner (TP) to be electronically integrated, while still 
providing the required security. The question arises: how does one determine 
what provides optimal interoperability and what provides optimal security in any 
given B2B IOIS? 
Neither ITSEC, nor TCSEC, nor CC is suitably applicable for evaluating security 
in networked and distributed systems (Oppliger, 2000: 15). The BS7799 (British 
Standard) Code of Practice (CoP) has as one of its objectives: "to provide 
confidence in inter-company trading" (Von Solms, 1998). However, the CoP is 
not a set of specifications and merely provides guidance and recommendations 
(BSS7799-1-1999:iii). Thus, the degree of interoperability between security 
systems of TPs is determined by which technology standards are implemented by 
each TP, as well as how they are implemented. No standard specifications 
framework appears to exist for ensuring interoperability between TP security 
systems in a B2B IOIS context. 
Therefore, it is contended here that a VPN solution between TPs can be 
configured such that interoperability between TP security systems in a B2B IOIS 
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context can be ensured, while still maintaining optimal security. The following 
are additional features of this solution: 
• Each TP may supplement the VPN solution with additional security 
layers, as dictated by risk-assessment, security policy, performance 
considerations and budgetary considerations, etc, without affecting 
interoperability. PGP-encrypted e-mail used over the VPN tunnel will, for 
instance, not be affected by the VPN configuration. 
• The ebXML templates for the Messaging Service and CPA may be used 
as the basis upon which details of the solution are specified. 
5.2. The Proposed Framework 
5.2. 1. Objectives 
The primary objective of this framework is to propose a possible standard set of 
choices in terms of security controls/countermeasures (technologies) and 
procedures used, to ensure interoperability between security systems of trading 
partners. 
At a minimum, irrespective of the configurations of OSI Reference Model layers, 
the framework should allow complete connectivity, while simultaneously 
providing all five security services. Further, the framework should be flexible 
enough to allow for additional security measures. 
5.2.2. Assumptions Based on Literature Review 
The following are assumed antecedents (for which no further provision is made 
in the proposed framework): 
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• Both parties in a B2B IOIS would be responsible for using a suitable 
yardstick (such as the BS 7799) to assess the risks implicit in the IOIS 
and to select the required controls to be implemented. Some of the 
possible risks in B2B IOISs include: Unauthorised transactions and fraud, 
disclosure of sensitive information on the network, errors in processing 
and communications, potential loss of management and audit data, and 
potential legal liability. If the parties decide to utilize the software 
envisaged by the ebXML designers, then presumably this step would 
eventually be supported by that software. (UN/CEFACT and OASIS10, 
2001: 13). 
• Business process agreements would have been established between 
participants in the B2B IOIS, by a commonly-agreed upon means as an 
integral part of the trading partner agreement (e.g. an ebXML CPA). 
• Each TP would have secured their site with appropriate security tools 
(as determined by their individual security policies) for prevention, 
detection and correction of security breaches. This would include staff 
training, firewalls, network scanners, intrusion detection tools, anti-virus 
software, data backup and recovery strategies and a business continuity 
plan. (Phaltankar, 2001: 130). 
• Web Servers (and related virtual servers, drives and directories) hosting 
information to be shared would have been secured by appropriate 
configuration, such as not to allow anonymous access, restricting access 
to a closed user group (CUG) (based on e.g. IP address or user 
authentication), and hidden URLs (Oppliger, 2000:22-40). Access 
control up to application level is an imperative, as is authentication, 
privacy, integrity and non-repudiation. Access control may be provided 
by Kerberos, for instance. 
• Each TP would have configured their firewall(s) and proxy server(s) to 
allow internal (corporate) users to communicate with the outside from 
within the corporate intranet; and remote users to access the inside from 
the outside. 
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• Each TP will employ network management tools for fault management, 
configuration management, accounting (charge) management, 
performance management and security management for the site 
(Phaltankar 2000:101-120). 
All of the above measures are considered essential to overall security, but are 
superfluous to maintaining interoperability between TPs. 
In formulating the proposed framework, the following trends in B2B IOISs 
are assumed: 
• B2B IOISs are VPNs and will thus utilize PKI as the currently optimal 
means to provide all five OSI security services (as described in Chapter 
1). 
• PKI software will tend towards using AES as the encryption algorithm of 
choice. 
• The increasing pervasiveness of digital certificates will make it a more 
affordable proposition in the near future. 
• For the sake of interoperability, the IPSec open standard is the protocol 
of choice for VPNs (King et al 2001, 183). For B2B, tunnel mode with 
ESP, and IKE for providing the PKI requirements, would be most 
appropriate. 
• The ebXML Technical Architecture (Chapter 3) will become the B2B 
platform of choice and become the means by which TP discovery, 
business process agreements, collaboration protocol profiles (CPPs) and 
collaboration protocol agreements (CPAs) are achieved. Thus, the 
framework proposed here would be specified on CPP and CPA 
templates, from which Message Services would be configured. 
• In terms of Choudury's IOIS typology (Chapter 3), a multilateral 
electronic market IOIS with less electronic integration, and less-detailed 
policy requirements, is initially preferred. This will evolve, in some 
cases, to electronic dyads and, ultimately, to electronic monopolies, if the 
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degree of integration increases. However, it is important to note that 
most studies undertaken in respect of IOIS involve EDI using private 
networks. B2B IOISs involve the public Internet, so that the set of 
vulnerabilities is much greater. 
• Transactions involving the transfer of funds would preferably be made 
by the payer into the payee's bank account. Hence, Internet payment 
options would not necessarily affect interoperability between TPs (even 
though it might affect business flows). 
5.2.3. Components Required for Interoperability 
The B2B IOIS infrastructure would, at a minimum, include the following (see 
Figure 5): 
TPl 
Intranet 
VPN 
appliance 
VPN 
appliance 
FIGURES: MINIMAL B2B IOIS INFRASTRUCTURE 
TP2 
Intranet 
At the heart of the interoperability framework is the actual configuration of the 
VPN appliances. 
5.2.3. 1. VPN appliances 
As pointed out earlier, the VPN appliances could be either routers configured as 
firewalls, or multi-homed computers (servers with two or more network cards) 
configured as firewalls with firewall software (such as Cisco's PIX firewall). 
Often, more than one firewall could be used on either or both ends. Each VPN 
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appliance would be further configured to include at least the following (see 
figure 6): 
VPN Appliance 
Must be configured with: 
1. A Digital Certificate to identify it uniquely 
2. IPSec: 
• which uses ESP 
o (using AES) 
• operating in tunnel mode, 
• utilising IKE and SAs 
FIGURE 6: MINIMAL INTEROPERABILITY COMPONENTS 
(a) Digital Certificates 
Each TP hosting a web server for B2B interaction requires a digital certificate 
(site certificate) supplied by a reputable CA. This is for use with IKE, which 
uses the Diffie-Hellmann algorithm for key exchange, at each receiving node. 
The certificate may also be used for other purposes, as in SSL/TLS. 
Diffie-Hellmann does not generally use a CA, but in PKI a CA is used to 
provide digital certificates, from which public keys are installed on the 
receiving nodes. IKE (using Diffie-Hellmann) can then use the sender's 
public key, to create a secret key. 
(b) IPSec protocol 
The IPSec protocol must be configured on both ends, with 
o Tunnel mode, using ESP. Each VPN node, including ISP 
gateways, should be configured with the connecting TP' s public 
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key. Tunnel mode encrypts the entire packet and encrypts and 
decrypts the packet at each node. 
o IKE. IKE provides: 
• The SA and key parameter negotiating service; 
• The primary authentication for communicating entities at 
the start of the negotiation; 
• The management of the key exchange; 
• The method for generating other keys for authentication 
and the encryption service. 
(Ibid). 
o Appropriate security associations (SAs). SAs comprise, e.g. the 
source IP addresses of the TPs and the cryptographic algorithm for 
each TP. Note that each SA has a unique identifier called the 
security parameter index (SPI), which enables the VPN appliance 
to select the appropriate SA. (Phaltankar, 2001:204). 
(c) Encryption algorithm 
For both symmetric encryption and hashing, AES would seem to be more 
than appropriate. This would optimally support interoperability in an 
electronic market IOIS. Phaltankar (2001:204) states that any symmetric 
encryption algorithm is supported by ESP. Thus, AES could be used in ESP 
encryption. 
(d) ebXML CPA Components 
VPN appliances would, additionally, be configured in respect of ebXML 
CPA components (as described in chapter 3). For example: the Telnet 
protocol might be disallowed. 
Configurations beyond the VPN appliance level would provide the necessary 
standardisation of infrastructure for business processes, semantics, messaging 
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and the processes (as contained in the CPA). Thus, the required pre-
specifications for sustainable collaboration within the IOIS - as discussed in 
chapter 2 - can be determined before any actual implementation. This is 
discussed in the next section. 
5.2.4. Proposed Procedural Guidelines 
The following steps, to be conducted in a recursive fashion, are proposed in the 
setting up of the B2B IOIS (see Figure 7): 
1. Develop an IOIS strategy (see chapter 2) 
2. Use BS7799/0SI17799 (Code of Practice) to extend the existing security 
policy for the TP' s internal network to include the IOIS strategy. 
3. Use the ebXML Registry (discussed in chapter 3) to obtain the details of 
a prospective TP. 
4. Ascertain the ebXML Collaborative Partner Profile (CPP) (chapter 3) of 
the prospective TP. 
5. Negotiate the terms of the Collaborative Partner Agreement (CPA) with 
the prospective TP, including security strategies, specifically with regard 
to the Messaging Service (MS) security parameters (chapter 3). 
6. Obtain a digital certificate from a reputable Certification Authority (CA), 
if one has not already been acquired. 
7. Download the semantic specifications for developing an ebXML-
compliant application and develop the application, or use a "shrink-
wrapped" application (chapter 3), for conducting business with the TP. 
8. Implement the IOIS security strategy in a layered fashion (using the OSI 
Reference Model for networks), using the recommended interoperability 
components. 
9. Use the ebXML application for conducting business with the TP. 
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TPl: EXTEND THE INTERNAL NETWORK SECURITY POLICY (DERIVED FROM 
BS7799) TO INCLUDE THE IOIS 
n 
USE THE FRAMEWORK TO DETERMINE THE COMPONENTS FOR OPTIMAL 
INTEROPERABILITY. 
OBTAIN A DIGITAL CERTIFICATE FROM A REPUTABLE CERTIFICATION 
AUTHORITY (CA). 
USE THE EBXML REGISTRY TO OBTAIN THE DETAILS OF A PROSPECTIVE TP 
(TP2). 
n 
ASCERTAIN THE CPP OF TP2. 
NEGOTIATE THE CPA WITH TP2, JlLUDING EBXML MS SECURITY 
PARAMETERS 
DEVELOP/ACQUIRE AN EBXML-COMPLIANT APPLICATION FOR CONDUCTING 
BUSINESS WITH TP2. 
IMPLEMENT THE IOIS SECURITY STRATEGY IN A LAYERED FASHION (BASED 
ON THE OSI RM), USING THE RECOMMENDED COMPONENTS 
USE THE EBXML APPLICATION FOR CONDUCTING BUSINESS WITH THE TP. 
FIGURE 7: PROCEDURAL GUIDELINES FOR INCORPORATING THE 
FRAMEWORK 
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5.3. Conclusion 
This chapter suggests a reference architecture for security interoperability across 
IOISs. It is not intended to be a complete framework. From the practitioner's 
perspective, it eliminates much of the guesswork in selecting specification 
options. 
It proposes a technological framework - underpinned by a policy-based, layered 
approach (using standards such as ISO 7498 and BSS 7799/ISO 17799) - which 
simultaneously ensures optimal interoperability and optimal security. The 
following are important points to note in this regard: 
• The IOIS security component is relatively independent of the rest of the 
TP' s internal security structure although it may share the same 
infrastructure. It simply requires the VPN appliance to be configured such 
that it is simultaneously compliant with the TP' s internal Security Policy 
and the CPA. The same appliance may be used for other TPs (using 
different SAs), based on other Security Policy and CPA stipulations. The 
VPN appliance is the crucial component of this interoperability 
framework. If the configurations were "standardized", as per the proposed 
framework, only the minimum (Security Policy and CPA) negotiations 
between TPs would be necessary. 
• It is suggested that, for the sake of interoperability and standardization, 
that the simultaneously most secure and most interoperable 
implementation of B2B IOIS electronic integration be used by both TPs. 
While the framework does not provide an all-encompassing set of 
specifications for security, it uses components which ensure 
interoperability and which are the most secure of available options. 
Therefore, the VPN options of IPSec, with ESP, tunnel mode, IKE, 
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digital certificates, and AES for encryption/hashing, are suggested as 
being standard choices for B2B IOISs. 
• The use of AES, for symmetric encryption and /or hashing, is certainly 
more expedient, as discussed previously. 
• Further implementations, such as PGP for e-mail, may be mutually-
agreed upon in the CPA. Since B2B IOISs, of necessity, use TCP/IP 
stacks - or appropriate gateways - and since UNICODE generally 
facilitates compatibility at the (OSI) presentation layer, application layer 
incompatibilities may be resolved subsequently (if not anticipated in the 
CPA). 
• The use of the ebXML specification suite is strongly recommended, 
especially since it facilitates interoperability at a business operational 
level as well as the functional services level. 
The incipient framework proposed in this chapter is evaluated in chapter 6, 
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Chapter 6 
Evaluation of the Framework 
6.1. Introduction 
In deciding how to implement a B2B IOIS security strategy, one is faced with the 
challenge of choosing from a host of security controls and procedural options. 
Some of the options are: 
• EDI or ebXML? 
• VPN or Private network? 
• VPN: leased line, ATM, Frame Relay, or Internet? 
• VPN: PPTP, L2TP, or IPSec? 
• Network Authentication/Identification: Kerberos, RADIUS, CHAP or 
digital certificates? 
• Privacy protocols: PGP, S/MIME, AES, DES, 3-DES or others (notably, 
Twofish, MARS, Serpent, and RC6)? 
• Integrity protocols: SHA-1, RSA, HMAC, DSA, or AES? 
• Authorization/Access control: Passwords, Kerberos, or ACLs? 
• Non-repudiation options: digital signatures or digital certificates? 
• Remote Access methods: RADIUS, CHAP, Kerberos, or digital 
certificates 
This list is by no means exhaustive, but serves merely to indicate the variety of 
options available. (The acronyms are explained on p6). Chapter 4 examined the 
more obvious risks related to B2B IOISs, and the corresponding 
countermeasures/ controls. In chapter 5, a set of controls and control parameters 
were chosen to present a recommended configuration for optimal 
interoperability. An interoperability "baseline" was sought. 
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From a client-server perspective, additional client and server controls would be 
required to attain the expected assurance level (EAL) in the envisaged protection 
profile (PP). Further, additional security controls - such as Layer 2 Tunnelling 
Protocol at the data link layer, or S/MIME at the application level (in terms of the 
OSI 7-Layer Reference Model), or the forbidding of Telnet packets with a 
(packet-filter) firewall - could be added to augment overall security. 
The physical implementation of this framework requires that an entire B2B IOIS 
be set up; such an operation would be beyond the scope of this dissertation. A 
theoretical evaluation is therefore provided. 
In order to evaluate the security of a site in which the equipment of a TP that 
participates in an IOIS is located, a comprehensive set of criteria such as 
contained in the Common Criteria, TCSEC or ITSEC, is required. The 
framework proposed does not purport to provide comprehensive security. Its 
point of departure is: interoperability of security implementations within the 
context of B2B IOISs. Hence, the criteria for evaluating the framework should 
emanate from the overall objective stated in section 5.2.1. 
6.2. Criteria for Evaluating the Framework 
• Has the problem context been thoroughly examined for security control 
options? 
• Is the set of controls proffered the most expedient for ensuring 
interoperability between TPs? 
• Are all five security services ensured by the framework? 
• Is optimal interoperability ensured? 
• Can the fundamental controls be augmented/supplemented with 
additional controls, without detracting from the original configuration? 
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6.2. 1. Has the problem context been thoroughly examined for security 
control options? 
Usage popularity- as reported in the literature - was used as a general yardstick 
for selecting the available control options. The following information was 
gleaned from the literature: 
• VPNs have become a de facto standard for B2B electronic commerce. 
The cost-effectiveness of using the Internet in preference to private 
networks is a powerful driver in this regard. Chapter 2 outlines the 
business benefits of implementing hypermedia IOISs. 
• The choice of IPSec in preference to other VPN protocols is explained in 
chapter 4. IPSec is being developed by the IETF primarily for IPv6, 
which is set to replace IPv4. However, in its current IPv4 
implementation, it is the protocol of choice for B2B scenarios, as 
described in chapter 4. 
• For scalable electronic markets, digital certificates issued by a noted CA 
are preferred for providing all five security services. The superiority of 
digital certificates over Kerberos and Key Distribution Centres, as well as 
over digital signatures, is described in chapter 4. 
• The ebXML initiative - which enjoys far-reaching support - has 
highlighted the trends favouring XML, UNICODE and multi-lateral 
electronic markets (in keeping with the open nature of the Internet). 
• The establishment of the Rijndael algorithm as the powerful new 
encryption standard (AES) makes it the automatic choice for symmetric 
encryption and hashing. 
6.2.2. Is the set of controls proffered the most expedient for ensuring 
interoperability between TPs? 
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In chapter 4 an attempt was made to indicate how flaws in encryption 
implementations may be overcome with alternative control options. It was shown 
that encryption has evolved to the point where keys require to be distributed and 
managed by means of a PKI for optimal efficiency; secret keys are generated 
locally and are not exchanged or transported. Public keys embedded in digital 
certificates - with characteristics equivalent to passports - are issued by a trusted 
third party (King et al, 2001 :359). 
In terms of providing optimal security (service) options (including sender 
authentication) and interoperability, digital certificates present the best current 
option. The PKIX X.509 v3 (discussed in Chapter 4) defines public extensions, 
which provide, inter alia, for Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs). Thus, 
certificates may be revoked, if necessary, allowing receiving nodes to disallow 
authorisation. Certificate management protocols support certificate enrolment, 
certificate revocation, key recovery and automated certificate renewal. (Ibid: 
363). Using a VPN with IKE (in tunnel mode) provides this fundamental 
interoperability. 
6.2.3. Are all five security services provided? 
The VPN between each two TPs would utilize encryption (AES) for 
secrecy/privacy, digital certificates for authentication, access 
control/authorization, and non-repudiation, and hashing algorithms (AES is 
recommended) for integrity. 
A specific SA is set up for each two TPs at each receiving node. ESP provides 
symmetric encryption (DES-CBC is currently commonly used) and hashing 
(HMAC with SHA-1 or MD5 are current options). IKE is used for negotiating 
the SA and setting up of AH and ESP services; the primary authentication at the 
start of the negotiation; the management of the key and nonce exchange; and 
determining the method for generating other keys for authentication and the 
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encryption service (Phaltankar 2000:206). Nonces prevent replay attacks and are 
used to generate fresh keys (Ibid). 
6.2.4. Is optimal interoperability ensured? 
The ebXML specifications allow for a Collaboration Protocol Profile (CPP) for 
each TP, stored in the Registry, which can be further negotiated by TPs. The CPP 
merely contains XML elements such as 
<DeliveryChannel > 
<Characteristics 
nonrepudiationOfOrigin=''false'' 
nonrepudiationOfReceipt=''false'' 
secureTransport=''true'' 
confidentiality=''false'' 
authenticated=''false'' 
authorized=''false'' 
/> 
</DeliveryChannel> 
Sub-elements of a Deli veryChannel must be further defined. For example, if 
the security attribute secureTransport is indicated in the CPP, then the 
Transport element of the CPP might contain details as follows: 
<Transport transportid="Nl2"> 
<Protocol version="l.l">HTTP</Protocol> 
<Endpointuri=https://www.ebxmlregisterservices.org/as 
ynch type="request"/> 
<TransportSecurity> 
<Protocol version="l.O">TLS</Protocol> 
<CertificateRef certid="NOS"/> 
</TransportSecurity> 
<Transport> 
The CPP defines different levels at which security may be implemented. For 
example, the transport level may use SSL/TLS. TPs negotiate the contents of 
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the CPPs, which results in a Collaboration Protocol Agreement (CPA) 
document. Currently this is a manual process. 
(UN/CEFACT and OASIS11 , 2001: 17-19). 
It is proposed in this dissertation that this step could be greatly expedited by the 
standardization of security implementations between TPs. As with cryptography, 
knowledge of the mechanics of the implementations should not weaken the 
security. (The algorithm for AES is popularly known, yet the strength of the 
algorithm is not unduly compromised by this fact). If all TPs utilized VPNs with 
IPSec - with ESP and IKE - and AES for encryption (including hashing), 
optimal interoperability would be ensured. As AES renders other cryptographic 
algorithms redundant, so such a framework would render other B2B IOIS 
implementations redundant. CP As could then be negotiated with greater 
effectiveness. 
6.2.5. Can the fundamental controls be augmented/supplemented with 
additional controls, without affecting the original configuration? 
The policy-based approach to security (as defined in the BSS 7799/ISOl 7799 
CoP) and the layered approach (as defined in ISO 7498-2) seem to represent the 
common trend in information security. Since the recommended IPSec protocol 
works at the network layer (OSI layer 3), the receiving node (such as a firewall) 
would examine the (tunnel mode) SA for its SPI value, after layer 1 and layer 2 
information have been stripped off the packet. The ESP (data and IP header both 
encrypted) is encapsulated by a standard IP packet (hence "tunnel mode") 
(Phaltankar, 2000:204). Thus, if L2TP- for instance - is properly implemented at 
layer two by both the sending and receiving nodes, this would not affect the 
IPSec implementation at layer three. Similarly, after the IPSec layer has been 
stripped off by the IPSec-compliant receiving node, SSL/TLS can be 
implemented at the transport layer (layer 4), and /or SOCKS at layer 5, and/or 
S/MIME (or PGP) at layer seven (Ibid: 207-209). The obvious disadvantages to 
88 
implementing additional layers of security would be increased latency and 
excessive bandwidth utilization. 
6.3. Conclusion 
This chapter evaluates the proposed framework fundamentals in the light of the 
objectives for the framework. 
The literature indicates that in terms of the criteria listed, the proposed controls 
would constitute a reasonable basis for a framework to be constructed for the 
security practitioner. By narrowing down the security options available to those 
best suited to B2B IOISs, a reference architecture for implementing an optimal 
interoperability solution has been successfully derived. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
This aim of this dissertation was to propose a set of controls and procedures as a 
foundation towards a framework for optimising interoperability between the 
security implementations of trading partners in a B2B IOIS context. The current 
standard for B2B IOIS interoperability is the ebXML set of specifications, for 
which software implementations (XML code generators) will soon be available. 
However, ebXML does not specify actual security controls or control parameters, 
and the range of permutations for possible implementations (controls) still 
remains vast. Hence, the objectives for the proposed framework included finding 
the most expedient controls in terms of optimising interoperability and ensuring 
that all five of the ISO-defined security services were provided by the chosen 
controls. Further, the envisaged framework had to provide a scalable foundation 
upon which additional controls could be added (preferably without having to 
renegotiate CPAs). 
Firstly, the fundamental concepts and terminology of information security were 
reviewed. This was followed by a review of the IOIS concept. Chapter 3 was 
used to review ebXML (and its predecessor, EDI) as a set of standard 
specifications for B2B IOISs, specifically multilateral electronic markets (using 
the public Internet, rather than dedicated private communication lines). At this 
point, it appeared that in view of the emerging ebXML standard, that all B2B 
IOISs should begin as multilateral electronic markets (with collaboration being 
the primary driver, rather than strategic gain), which may evolve to electronic 
dyads and ultimately, electronic monopolies, as dictated by required electronic 
integration and IOIS policies (plans, rules, regulations). The business foundations 
of IOIS were only superficially considered, merely as a basis for understanding 
the migration to e-commerce/B2B IOIS/ebXML from EDI. 
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A review of the available security controls in the context of B2B IOIS was 
undertaken in chapter 4. This review was intended to cover the breadth of 
security controls rather than to explore each in depth. Encryption technologies 
were examined in the light of evolving enhancements to the point of key 
management facilitation. Various implementations of security controls were 
considered. 
Thereafter, a set of specifications was proposed to ensure optimal interoperability 
between TPs. The emergent technologies playing a role in B2B IOISs, in general, 
include VPNs, ebXML and PK.I. A review of the related literature reveals that the 
complexities of each of these technologies - from the perspective of the 
practitioner - could be reduced by "standardising" on available (and evolving) 
standards. ebXML CPAs could be arrived at more effectively. For instance, all 
B2B VPNs should use VPN appliances compatible with IPSec (using tunnel 
mode SAs and IKE); and IPSec and PK.I should standardize/rationalize on AES 
for encryption (including hashing). ebXML specifications for business processes 
and semantics (obtained and registered from the ebXML Registry) would provide 
the (other) necessary business and technical standards. 
In chapter 6, the proposed specifications were evaluated in terms of criteria based 
on the objectives from which the specifications were derived. It was concluded 
that the literature supported the set of specifications proposed towards a more 
comprehensive framework (for use by practitioners). A natural progression from 
this work would be an attempt to synthesise a comprehensive framework, based 
on ebXML, IPSec and PK.I (incorporating the future XML signature standard). 
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Abstract 
A vast range of controls/countermeasures exists for implementing security on 
information systems connected to the Internet. For the practitioner attempting to 
implement an integrated solution between trading partners operating across the 
Internet, this has serious implications in respect of interoperability between the 
security systems of the trading partners. The problem is exacerbated by the range of 
specification options within each control. 
This research is an attempt to find a set of relevant controls and specifications towards 
a framework for ensuring optimal interoperability between trading partners in this 
context. Since a policy-based, layered approach is advocated, which allows each 
trading partner to address localized risks independently, no exhaustive risk analysis is 
attempted. The focus is on infrastructure that is simultaneously optimally secure and 
provides optimal interoperability. It should also be scalable, allowing for additional 
security controls to be added whenever deemed necessary. 
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